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I. INTRODUCTION
The economic substance doctrine is a judicial method used to
evaluate transactions suspected of being nothing more than elaborate
(and illicit) tax avoidance. The doctrine was developed in the court
system, and its precise requirements are continually evolving.
Generally, the test consists of a subjective inquiry into whether a
taxpayer had a nontax purpose for entering the suspect transaction
and an objective inquiry into whether the transaction accomplished
anything beyond tax effects.' These inquiries frequently focus on the
economic profit available in the transaction because taxpayers often
assert a profit motive as their nontax reason for entering the suspect
I The subjective inquiry is sometimes treated as a separate test, known as the
business purpose test. Not all courts require the taxpayer to meet both subjective and
objective inquiries. See Joint Committee on Taxation, JCT Describes Chairman's
Modification of Phone Tax Repeal and Taxpayer Protection Bills, 2006 TNT 125-14
(June 29, 2006). This article does not address whether the economic substance
doctrine should include both inquiries.
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transaction. Economic profit is determined by looking to the pre-tax
landscape.
The use of pre-tax analysis reflects the idea that a genuine
economic transaction will yield a higher return before taxes than after
taxes. This article suggests that although this idea has intuitive appeal
and provides some indication of economic substance, exclusive use of
the pre-tax viewpoint is fundamentally flawed. This article reviews the
problems associated with the pre-tax viewpoint and proposes an
alternative framework for testing objective economic substance.2
Under the proposed framework, the after-tax return on the
suspect transaction would be compared to the return available on an
economically equivalent market transaction. If the after-tax return on
the suspect transaction were substantially similar to the return
available on a comparable transaction, the taxpayer would satisfy the
objective economic substance inquiry. If, however, the taxpayer's
after-tax return on the suspect transaction were substantially higher
than the return on economically comparable market transactions, the
suspect transaction would be presumed to fail the objective economic
substance inquiry.
When a transaction fails the comparables inquiry, the taxpayer
would still be able to rebut the presumption that the transaction lacks
economic substance by demonstrating that the additional return more
likely than not arose because she was part of a naturally occurring tax
clientele for the transaction. A "tax clientele" is a group whose
members have a preference for a particular asset or transaction
because their tax bracket affords them an extra return that the
investor setting the price of the asset is unable to attain. This rebuttal
takes the form of the taxpayer demonstrating membership in a natural
tax clientele because Congress presumably sanctions (and even
encourages) the formation of broad tax clienteles through the
progressive rate system. For example, in the case of tax-exempt bonds,
high tax bracket taxpayers will be able to earn a higher return than on
a comparable taxable bond if the price on both assets is set by a
taxpayer in a lower bracket.3
If the comparables test could not be performed because of the
2 This article does not address the subjective motive inquiry. This article also
does not take a position as to whether the doctrine should be codified. For a
discussion regarding textualist attacks on the doctrine and the advisability of its being
codified, see Brian Galle, Interpretive Theory and Tax Regulation, 26 VA. TAX REV.
357 (2006).
3 See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text (providing an example of tax-
exempt and taxable bonds).
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absence of a suitable comparable, the court would turn to a factor-
based inquiry into whether the after-tax result more likely than not
resulted from economic opportunity other than tax arbitrage.4
Relevant factors in this determination would include analysis of any
imperfect comparables, the ease with which other taxpayers could
have entered into the transaction, the presence or absence of a known
tax-shelter promoter, the dependence of the after-tax return on
particular tax attributes of the taxpayer or counterparty, the timing
and circumstances surrounding the creation of those tax attributes,
and the extent of risk and pre-tax profit.5
This article will review the problems associated with the pre-tax
viewpoint and propose an alternative method for testing objective
economic substance. In particular, Part II will provide an overview of
the economic substance doctrine and discuss the assumptions about
this doctrine that underlie the proposed method. Part III will critique
the current pre-tax approach to an objective inquiry into profit. Part
IV will detail the proposed objective economic substance framework.
Part V will consider how the proposed framework might have been
applied to two cases - Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner
and Black & Decker Corp. v. United States. Part VI states the article's
conclusion.
II. OBJECTIVE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE
This Part will briefly describe the economic substance doctrine
and also outline the background assumptions regarding when the
doctrine should be applied and what work the objective prong of the
doctrine should perform. These assumptions are working assumptions;
' See William A. Klein & Kirk J. Stark, Compaq v. Commissioner - Where Is
the Tax Arbitrage?, 94 TAX NOTES 1335, 1335-36 (Mar. 11, 2002) (defining classic tax
arbitrage as arising "from the differential tax treatment of an individual taxpayer's
cash flows"); see also Daniel N. Shaviro, The Story of Knetsch: Judicial Doctrines
Combating Tax Avoidance, in TAX STORIES 314, 314-15 (Paul Caron ed., 2003)
(distinguishing between economic and tax arbitrage). The use of a post-tax
perspective in economic substance has been raised in Mitchell Kane, Compaq and
IES: Putting the Tax Back into After-Tax Income, 94 TAX NOTES 1215, 1217 (Mar. 4,
2002).
5 See Klein & Stark, supra note 4, at 1335-36 (listing similar factors in the
context of the Compaq decision); Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The
Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 734 (2007)
(discussing factors related to the relationship between taxpayer and other parties,
including how "the presence of certain types of parties may be a red flag suggesting
the possibility of abuse").
[Vol. 27:783
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an in-depth defense of them is beyond the scope of this article.
In general, the economic substance doctrine is applied to
transactions when a taxpayer has technically met statutory and
regulatory requirements but has met these requirements in such a way
that the specific result of the transaction or series of transactions is
unlikely to have been foreseen by Congress or regulators. The precise
structure of the economic substance doctrine is not settled, and
enumeration of the doctrine's many variations is beyond the scope ofS 6
this article. Generally, however, the doctrine consists of both a
subjective and an objective prong. The subjective prong is satisfied if
the taxpayer had a nontax business or investment purpose for entering
into the transaction. The objective prong looks to whether the
transaction accomplished anything beyond generating the claimed tax
8benefits. This article focuses on the objective prong of the economic
substance doctrine.
The objective and subjective inquiries of the economic substance
doctrine often dovetail. Thus, for example, a taxpayer who asserts that
she entered a suspect transaction in order to earn a pre-tax profit
would satisfy the objective prong by demonstrating the
reasonableness of attaining that goal.9 The courts have not reached a
consensus as to the weight each prong should be given. Some courts
require taxpayers to satisfy both prongs, whereas in other courts
taxpayers need only satisfy one prong in order for the transaction to
survive scrutiny.' ° This article does not take a position as to the weight
the courts should give the two prongs.
The economic substance doctrine is only one of several tests
developed in the courts for the purpose of scrutinizing claimed tax
benefits. Each of these tests fills a slightly different - though
6 See PAUL R. MCDANIEL ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1326-29 (5th ed.
2004) (reviewing background of economic substance doctrine); Joseph Bankman, The
Economic Substance Doctrine, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 5, 7-27 (2000) (overview of
economic substance doctrine); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic
Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 241-53 (1999) (discussing the "history and scope" of the
economic substance doctrine); Yoram Keinan, The Economic Substance Doctrine, 508
TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (BNA) A37-A57 (2006) (overview of the many variations on
the doctrine); Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Requirement of Economic Profit in Tax
Motivated Transactions, 59 TAXES 985 (1981).
7 See Keinan, supra note 6, at A44.
8 See id. at A43-A44.
9 See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 787 (5th
Cir. 2001).
10 See Keinan, supra note 6, at A42-A43.
HeinOnline  -- 27 Va. Tax Rev. 787 2007-2008
788 Virginia Tax Review [Vol. 27:783
occasionally overlapping - niche in the world of tax litigation.
Although the subjective and objective prongs together form the
economic substance doctrine, these two prongs fill distinct roles. The
objective economic substance prong is closely related to the sham
transaction doctrine and to the more generalized "substance-over-
form" approach. These two tests inform this article's working
assumptions about the boundaries and content of the objective
economic substance test.
The sham transaction doctrine1 is applied when a taxpayer claims
tax benefits based on having taken certain steps but, as a factual
matter, the taxpayer did not actually complete those steps. In the case
of financial transactions, it can be difficult to tell whether a
transaction was real or fictional. Financial assets may exist only as
book entries, and transactions may involve offsets or pairoffs at the
dealer level, which can be more difficult to verify than transactions
taking place at the primary market level. 2 In such a situation, the
court will look to industry custom in discerning whether a transaction
factually took place. 3 If a court makes a finding of factual sham, the
transaction is completely disregarded, along with its attendant tax
benefits.
The more generalized substance-over-form approach applies to
transactions that have factually occurred but about which there is
concern over whether the transaction has been mislabeled. If the court
finds that mislabeling has occurred, the tax consequences of the
transaction are adjusted to match the substance of the transaction.
The substance of the transaction is often determined with reference to
how closely the suspect transaction tracks similarly labeled market
transactions.
1 Courts occasionally use the term "sham" when discussing the economic
substance doctrine, and vice versa. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States,
436 F.3d 431, 440 (4th Cir. 2006); Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner,
820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987) (describing test for sham transaction as consisting
of a subjective business purpose factor and an economic substance factor); see also
Hariton, supra note 6 (noting the "unfortunate habit" in the Third Circuit of "calling
the economic substance doctrine the 'sham' doctrine").
12 See Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738, 740-41 (1990) (describing book-
entry form and dealer pairoffs for Treasury bills). The Tax Court specifically
considers whether the dealers involved were objectively capable of handling the size
of the transaction, whether the transaction was prearranged to deliver a particular
level of loss, and whether the margin deposits required from the taxpayer were
consistent with the size of the transaction. Id. at 754.
13 See id. at 753-54 (looking to industry custom to decide whether "purported T-
Bill purchases and repos were fictitious").
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For example, the substance-over-form approach is frequently
invoked by the government to scrutinize transactions between a
closely-held corporation and its shareholders. 14  A profitable
corporation might pay a large amount of rent to its landlord - who
also happens to be the corporation's sole shareholder. A court
reviewing this transaction would make a factual determination as to
whether a portion of the "rent" was in substance a corporate
distribution to the shareholder. Evidence about the fair rental value of
the property would be highly relevant to the court's inquiry. 5 If the
court finds that the rent charged by the shareholder significantly
exceeds the amount that would have been charged in the same market
by an unrelated party, the shareholder would likely be required to
include the excess amount as dividend income, 6 and the corporation
would forgo its "rental" deduction for the excess portion of the rent
charged.
General substance-over-form tends to be applied when two
mutually exclusive categories are readily identifiable - for example,171
dividend versus rent, 7 owner versus lessee, 8 debt versus equity,19 or
partner versus creditor. 0 The presence of a specific alternative
provides an anchor to a court's inquiry into the substance of a
particular transaction and guidance to the taxpayers in their business
transactions. To be sure, considerable uncertainty and controversy can
surround the questions of how best to assign a particular transaction
14 See LEANDRA LEDERMAN, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE TAXATION 117 (2d
ed. 2006) (describing problem of mislabeling of distributions to shareholders of
closely held corporations). Taxpayers may also invoke the substance-over-form
doctrine. See, e.g., Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769, 774 (11th Cir. 1985)
("[N]othing in the Internal Revenue Code or our decisions suggests that the factors
used to determine the substantive character of a taxpayer's interest in a corporation
are available only to the government.").
15 Anjanette T. Frias, Dividends - Cash & Property, 764-3d TAX MGMT.
PORTFOLIO (BNA) A-19-A-35 (2006) (analyzing various rent cases and concluding
that "[e]vidence that rental payments do not exceed the fair rental value of the
property should negate the appearance of a constructive dividend").
16 The excess would have to be included as a dividend to the extent of corporate
earnings and profits. I.R.C. §§ 301, 316.
17 See, e.g., 58th St. Plaza Theatre, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir.
1952).
18 See, e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978).
19 See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 694 (3d Cir. 1968).
20 See ASA Investerings v. Commissioner, 201 F.3d 505, 513-16 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(agreeing with the Tax Court that foreign bank was a creditor rather than a partner in
a complex transaction designed to generate losses to the taxpayer).
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or taxpayer and whether certain categories should be respected asS22
distinct categories. In spite of these concerns, the use of general
substance-over-form principles is widely accepted as a necessary
23
component of the tax system.
The more controversial objective economic substance test tends
to be applied when the transaction actually happened but there is no
obvious alternative label applicable to the transaction. That is, the
transaction is sufficiently complex or novel that the analysis requires
more than making a choice between two readily recognizable tax
categories. Instead, courts frame the objective economic test as a
choice between the existence and nonexistence of the transaction for
tax purposes. In other words (and putting to one side the possible
effects of the subjective inquiry) the court determines whether the
transaction should be ignored even though it factually took place. In
general, this determination hinges on whether the transaction
accomplished anything beyond tax effects.
In answering this open-ended question, courts frequently turn to
analysis of the profit potential - exclusive of tax benefits - of the
transaction. Part III takes up the profit potential test in greater detail.
As will be discussed in that Part, the appeal of using pre-tax profit
21 See William T. Plumb, Jr., The Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate
Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAx L. REV. 369, 371 (1971) (discussing
and critiquing the "jungle of criteria by which the courts have attempted to distinguish
debt from equity"); Bernard Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A
Failure of Judicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1075-76 (1980-81) (discussing
Supreme Court's "misperception of some of the facts" in Frank Lyon and arguing
that proper consideration of these facts would have led the Court to conclude that the
"lessee" was the true owner and the taxpayer was not entitled to depreciation
deductions).
22 See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, Taxation Without
Realization: A "Revolutionary" Approach to Ownership, 47 TAx L. REV. 725, 726
(1992) (discussing problems with tax law "insist[ing] that there is a single 'owner' of
'the property' at any given time"); Edward D. Kleinbard, Equity Derivative Products:
Financial Innovation's Newest Challenge to the Tax System, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1319,
1320 (1991) (discussing the difficulty of taxing debt-equity hybrids because of the tax
system approach of "describing a finite number of idealized transactions and
attaching to each a set of operative rules - what might be termed a set of tax
cubbyholes").
23 See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and
Corporate Tax Shelters: Random Thoughts on Applying Judicial Doctrines to Interpret
the Internal Revenue Code, 54 SMU L. REV. 195, 197 (2001) (describing substance-
over-form as a "venerable doctrine[]" and one which is also found to be "quite
respectable and properly applied" by taxpayers when the approach operates in their
favor).
790 [Vol. 27:783
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relates to the idea that individuals who are engaging in genuine
economic transactions will be focused on a transaction's return before
24taxes. This assumption, however, fails to take into account the extent
to which individuals make decisions based on their particularized tax
circumstances and the effect that strategic taxpayer behavior has on
the price of transactions.
In addition, use of a tax-exclusive viewpoint requires that courts
consider not only actual pre-tax profit but pre-tax profit potential and
risk. Attempts to identify pre-tax profit potential provide taxpayers
with the opportunity to argue (and build-in) multiple alternate
endings. As a result of these concerns, the amount of pre-tax profit
necessary to save a transaction has not been settled. Various court
cases and recent economic substance codification proposals suggest
several different methods of harnessing inquiries into profit potential
and specifying the required amount of pre-tax profit. Yet, as discussed
in Part III.A, disagreement persists over the question of how best to
assess profit potential and risk.
As discussed above, the presence of obvious binary categories
frequently leads the court to use a general substance-over-form
approach and, in conjunction, to undertake a simple comparables
analysis. Courts, however, generally invoke the objective economic
substance prong for more complex or novel transactions. As a result,
current judicial formulations of economic substance generally do not
involve the use of comparables analysis. This article suggests that it is
possible to use a comparables analysis when answering the question
whether a complex suspect transaction accomplishes anything beyond
tax effects. Although the pre-tax profit approach to objective
economic substance does work in certain circumstances, a
comparables approach may yield a more certain and less controversial
framework for determining the presence of objective economic
substance. Part IV proposes and details a comparables approach to
the problem of determining objective economic substance. The
proposed approach relies on generally accepted ideas about the
standard relationship between risk and reward.
Even though the proposed comparables approach brings the
objective economic substance test closer to the more general
21
substance-over-form approach, this article does not propose a
24 Cf. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 317 ("[T]he key to a potentially appealing tax
shelter is that it reduce your taxable income by much more than it reduces your pre-
tax economic income.").
21 Some courts have described objective economic substance as incorporating
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change to the consequences of failing the objective economic test.
(Again, this article puts aside the question of how taxpayer motivation
should affect the final outcome.) While the consequences of failing the
test may seem harsh, the test itself is not overly restrictive. The
taxpayer need only show that the transaction accomplished something
beyond tax effects - that it was not a substantive sham. As described
in Part IV, the approach proposed in this article allows the suspect
transaction's after-tax results to be assessed against a range of
comparables. Only if the taxpayer fails to find a comparable with a
return similar to the suspect transaction (assuming the government
has an adequate comparable) will the transaction be presumed to fail
the objective economic substance test. Furthermore, this presumption
is rebuttable.
Since the consequences of failing the objective economic
substance test can be severe, this article accepts, as a working
assumption, that the objective economic substance test should be
invoked only when more direct approaches to assessing a suspect
transaction do not work. Thus, statutory tests and the general
substance-over-form test should be applied in preference to the
26
objective economic substance test. Further, congressionally-
sanctioned tax benefits obtained through standard channels should
not be scrutinized under objective economic substance.2' To take a
simple (and obvious) situation, the deduction of qualified home
mortgage interest by the resident home owner is a congressionally
the general substance-over-form approach. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
26 The choice to use the economic substance doctrine over other tools is a topic
that has generated significant debate. See, e.g., Bankman, supra note 6, at 5-7
(describing controversy over the use of common law doctrines in general and
economic substance in particular); Pamela F. Olson, Now That You've Caught the
Bus, What Are You Going To Do With It?, 60 TAX LAW. 567, 574 (2007) ("Rather
than a careful analysis of the relevant statutory or regulatory provisions, it [economic
substance] allows the tax administrator to attack every transaction it finds
offensive .... The tax administrator may miss compelling statutory or regulatory
arguments that would have produced a decision for the government ... ").
27 See Bankman, supra note 6, at 13 ("The primary limitation on the objective
economic substance doctrine... [is that it] cannot apply where a sensible reading of
text, legislative intent, and purpose suggest it should not apply."); see also David P.
Hariton, When and How Should the Economic Substance Doctrine Be Applied?, 60
TAX L. REV. 29, 31 (2006) ("The tax benefits arising from such a transaction [lacking
economic substance] should not be disallowed unless they are clearly inconsistent
with tax policy and congressional intent."); Warren, supra note 6, at 990 ("[W]here
Congress has enacted an incentive.., it can be argued that application of the
requirement of a pretax profit would interfere with the Congressional goal, perhaps
even creating perverse results.").
[Vol. 27:783
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28intended tax benefit obtained by the taxpayer in the normal way and
would not be susceptible to an objective economic substance attack.
To be sure, taxpayers fighting the application of economic
substance to their transaction will argue that their claimed tax benefit
has congressional approval because the taxpayers will have formally
met the technical requirements for obtaining the benefit.29 Thus, while
the economic substance doctrine should not be invoked in the case of
obviously intended tax benefits, it is appropriate to invoke economic
substance to test transactions when the taxpayer has taken a less
obvious path to a claimed tax benefit.0
III. PRE-TAX PROFIT
Inquiring into pre-tax profit has become a primary method of
approaching objective economic substance, yet difficult questions
remain about how best to assess profit potential and the weight it
should be given in the analysis. This Part discusses in greater detail the
problems inherent in any pre-tax profit inquiry.
A. Weighing Potentialities
Use of the pre-tax profit viewpoint requires courts to consider not
only actual pre-tax profit but pre-tax profit potential. Taxpayers
investing for nontax motives may suffer genuine economic loss,
whether because of general market downturns or transaction-specific
losses. Thus, an analysis of profit potential must take into account the
possibility of genuine loss - and lack of an actual pre-tax profit is not
conclusive evidence that a taxpayer objectively lacked a pre-tax profit
motive." The taxpayer may simply have lost on a genuine economic
gamble.
While an inquiry into pre-tax profit potential protects against
denying deductions for genuine losses, it also provides taxpayers with
I.R.C. § 163(h)(3).
29 See McMahon, supra note 23, at 196 ("[P]rominent tax lawyers.., decry the
application of judicial doctrines in derogation of what they perceive to be the
unambiguous results produced by the interaction of multiple sections of the Code and
regulations to a complicated fact pattern .... ).
'0 Cf. id. at 197 ("The all too true aphorism... - 'Substance controls over form,
except, of course, in those cases in which form controls' - really does accurately
describe the rule.").
31 Cf. Hariton, supra note 6, at 236 ("Taking a naked position in commodities
has economic substance ... even if it is likely to produce a loss.").
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the opportunity to present multiple accounts of the transaction and to
build in remote contingencies or small profit amounts.32 For example,
a complex transaction essentially guaranteed to generate a loss might
integrate a bet about the direction of a particular interest rate or value
of a financial asset. In court, the taxpayer will argue that such a bet
saves the entire transaction from failing objective economic
substance.33 Government litigators will, of course, be on the watch for
such ancillary profit-potential hooks and will argue that the court
should disregard them. Some courts have, however, been drawn in by
such profit-potential hooks, particularly when the taxpayer has
emphasized elements of market risk. For example, in Compaq
Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, discussed in greater detail in Part
V.A, the Fifth Circuit gave some weight to the fact that part of the
disputed transaction occurred through the New York Stock
Exchange. 34 The court reasoned that this made the transaction more
genuine since the setting meant that someone could have stepped into
the middle of the transaction and altered its outcome.35
Closely related to the problem of taxpayer-engineered, profit-
potential hooks is the question of how much profit potential is
required in order to imbue a transaction with economic substance.
Taxpayers will argue that the presence of an actual pre-tax profit,
however nominal, conclusively demonstrates the objective
36reasonableness of their subjective profit expectation. Various courts
and other government actors have made an effort to limit the degree
of speculation taxpayers may engage in about profit potential and to
quantify the amount of profit potential required. Two interrelated
approaches to these problems have been proposed.
32 See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254, 284 (1999)
(taxpayer argued that profit was possible in corporate owned life insurance
transaction "if some catastrophe were to occur that would produce large, unexpected
death benefits"); Hariton, supra note 6, at 249 ("[Wjhere a tax-motivated transaction
takes the form of an investment, the taxpayer can always contribute enough net
equity to assure that there will be significant net profit .... ").
33 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738, 765-68 (1990) (describing
transactions in which taxpayers argued profit potential based on possibility of
appreciation in Treasury bills and explaining that the "fact that they [the transactions]
permitted open positions for limited periods of time was ... to formulate the
appearance of potential for gain or loss").
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001).
35 Id. at 787.
See, e.g., Sheldon, 94 T.C. at 767 (explaining that the Goldstein case "would
not, as petitioners suggest, permit deductions merely because a taxpayer had or
experienced some de minimis gain").
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The first approach is to require that the expected pre-tax profit
bear a reasonable relationship to the expected tax benefits.37 The Tax
Court, for example, refused to give weight to a profit potential that it
considered "infinitesimally nominal and vastly insignificant when
considered in comparison with the claimed deductions."38 The second
approach is to require that the reasonably anticipated pre-tax profit
exceed some minimum amount - generally, the rate on no- or low-
risk investments.39 Setting the minimum profit potential to a low- or
no-risk return is akin to using a comparables approach. The
underlying rationale is that if the suspect transaction has no more
profit potential than a risk-free investment, the taxpayer must have
entered into the suspect transaction to gain a tax arbitrage advantage.
Otherwise, the taxpayer would have simply invested directly in the
risk-free asset.4°
These approaches do restrict the range of possible alternate
configurations available to a taxpayer and provide some guidance as
to the amount of required pre-tax profit potential. Yet these
approaches have inherent weaknesses apart from their failure to
account for implicit taxes and the formation of tax clienteles.4 ' First,
37 See, e.g., Rice's Toyota World v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 89, 94 (4th Cir.
1985).
' Sheldon, 94 T.C. at 768.
39 See Bankman, supra note 6, at 24-25 (discussing implementation of various
hurdle rate approaches - including the possibility of looking to the pre-tax return
earned on other investments assets in the taxpayer's portfolio).
Recent codification proposals included both approaches: "[T]he profit potential
must exceed a risk-free rate of return" and "the present value of the reasonably
expected pre-tax profit must be substantial in relation to the present value of the
expected net tax benefits that would be allowed if the transaction were respected."
Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 1.
40 See Bankman, supra note 6, at 25 ("[T]he decision to use a combination of
Citicorp debt, LIBOR notes, and hedges to obtain the return and risk characteristics
offered by government debt serves no business purpose: The taxpayer could have
gotten that same return with lower transaction costs had it simply... invest[ed] in
government debt.").
The Internal Revenue Code (Code) elsewhere does make use of a low-risk
return in restricting tax benefits. Section 382 limits the amount of income that can be
offset by losses incurred by a corporation prior to an ownership change. The income
amount is limited to the value of the stock of the old corporation multiplied by a long-
term tax-exempt rate. I.R.C. §§ 382(b)(1), (e)(1), (f).
41 Professor Warren has summarized well the "inherent dilemma" of using pre-
tax profit:
The requirement of a pretax profit... involves an inherent dilemma
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the comparison of pre-tax profit to tax benefits introduces a new
avenue for speculation - expected net tax benefits. While the actual
tax benefits would likely serve as strong evidence of the anticipated
tax benefits, taxpayers could be afforded some opportunity to argue
that they reasonably anticipated much lower tax benefits. Second,
reasonable expectation tests appear susceptible to becoming
inextricably linked to the taxpayer's subjective motive, which may
further dispose a court to allow speculation about contingencies -
perhaps to ensure a fair result given the implication of criminality or
moral turpitude attaching to the taxpayer's conduct when the tax42 43
shelter42 label is applied.
Finally, requiring a specific level of return will likely trigger
arguments asserting that such a requirement in effect gives the
government power to direct taxpayer investment and that the
minimum return requirement could cause taxpayers inefficiently to
take on extra risk in order to ensure that the return on a transaction
because either the tax effect of a transaction turns on the presence of some
positive, but trivial, pretax profit or, if more than a trivial pretax profit is
necessary, there is no logical limitation on the amount of such profit
required, short of what the market would command in such transactions if
no tax benefits were involved. The first branch of the dilemma - that the
pretax profit need only be positive - is arbitrary because a very small
economic profit will validate a transaction that may be dominated by tax
considerations, whereas a very small economic loss will invalidate the same
transaction. But the second branch of the dilemma - requirement of a full
market return - is logically incoherent because it ignores the fact that the
capital markets will take preferential tax treatment into account in setting
relative prices.... Finally, any intermediate position - such as requiring a
'reasonable' pretax return, somewhere between a trivial amount and a full
market return - is unsatisfying because choice of the intermediate position
is also necessarily arbitrary.
Warren, supra note 6, at 987.
42 The term "tax shelter" is here used descriptively only to indicate a transaction
that a court has disregarded or likely would disregard through application of one of
the standard anti-tax shelter tools (e.g., sham transaction, economic substance
doctrine, etc.). The article does not address the normative question of which
transactions should be labeled "tax shelters," except indirectly through arguing that
this article's proposed framework identifies transactions that lack objective economic
substance. See JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 280 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing lack of consensus
on the definition of the term "tax shelter").
43 Cf David Cay Johnston, Comment on Joseph Bankman's 'The Tax Shelter
Battle,' in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 28, 28 ("If you are going to talk about
tax shelters, and about taxes in this country, you cannot lose sight of [the] moral
component.").
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clears the minimum profit potential hurdle." Of course, there have
also been some subtle (and not-so-subtle) suggestions that
sophisticated taxpayers would still find it easy to add pre-tax profit to
a particular transaction4 ' and "then hedge out of the associated risks in
• , • 46
ways that could not readily be identified." While it may be overly
optimistic to imagine that taxpayers and their attorneys would ever -
even grudgingly - agree to a particular formulation of economic
substance, it does not follow that such criticisms should be
automatically dismissed.
Such criticisms may indicate a failure to balance properly
certainty and uncertainty in the current mix of pre-tax profit
proposals. The desirability of a particular mix of certainty (rules) and
uncertainty (standards) has generated a substantial body of
scholarship. 47 A short, simplified version will suffice here: too much
certainty and narrowness, and taxpayers might simply be able to work
around the new rule or even find ways to use the rule to bootstrap a
new shelter;48 too much uncertainty and breadth, and taxpayers may
decide to treat the new standard as meaningless.4 ' The balance
4 Cf. Hariton, supra note 27, at 48 ("If the price of entering into a tax shelter is
that the taxpayer must take on unique economic risk that is substantial in relation to
the tax benefits in question, we can rely on the fact that relatively few taxpayers will
be willing to expose themselves to such risk merely to claim questionable tax benefits.
But if the price of entering into a tax shelter is merely that the taxpayer must safely
invest capital at the same time, then we shall see many such shelters, for investing
capital is something that corporations and wealthy taxpayers do in the ordinary
course.").
41 See Hariton, supra note 6 ("[W]here a tax-motivated transaction takes the
form of an investment, the taxpayer can always contribute enough net equity to
assure that there will be significant net profit .... ); see also Kane, supra note 4
(discussing Hariton's statements).
46 Hariton, supra note 27, at 49.
" See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42
DUKE L.J. 557 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953
(1995); David A. Weisbach, Comment on Joseph Bankman's 'The Tax Shelter Battle,'
in THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 30, 35-37 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod,
eds. 2004); David A. Weisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 860
(1999).
48 See Martin D. Ginsburg, Making Tax Law Through Judicial Process, A.B.A.
J., Mar. 1984, at 74, 76 ("Every stick crafted to beat on the head of a taxpayer will,
sooner or later, metamorphose into a large green snake and bite the Commissioner on
the hind part.").
49 See Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the
Search for a Silver Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1939, 1953 (2005) (proposing
disallowance rules in order to create an approach that avoids "both the problem of
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between certainty and uncertainty will also have ramifications at the
government level. Flexibility in the tools used to combat tax shelters is
critical, yet government actors should be able to deploy such tools
more efficiently if they can better predict outcomes.
The persistence and volume of the complaints about the economic
substance doctrine and codification proposals suggest that the balance
of rules and standards is not quite right in current formulations of the
doctrine. A frequent taxpayer criticism of attempts to codify economic
substance is that the doctrine over-deters and creates uncertainty
because of its potential to jeopardize congressionally intended
benefits. Use of the pre-tax viewpoint may, however, create a setting
in which taxpayer obfuscation flourishes and government actors feel
compelled to try economic substance in case it works. The proposed
alternate framework for determining objective economic substance
shifts initial inquiries into profit and risk to a more rule-oriented test.
The comparables method also helps sidestep the problem of the
government requiring a specific, expected profit amount while still
using risk to restrain tax shelters. ° Although the proposed framework
begins with a brighter-line approach, it then moves to an approach
that is more open-ended and factor-based.51
B. After-Tax World
A more fundamental problem with the pre-tax landscape is the
assumption that the economics of a transaction are readily separable
from its tax components. The initial appeal of quantifying pre-tax
profit seems to stem from the idea that an individual who is engaging
shelters escaping because the law gives courts the flexibility to let them escape, and
the problem that narrowly-targeted legislative responses are always one step behind
the tax shelter industry"); Hariton, supra note 6, at 238 ("Most practitioners
believe.., that there is a need for some sort of balancing between rules and standards
and that a judicious sprinkling of standards throughout a fundamentally objective set
of statutes and regulations is a beneficial palliative.").
'0 Cf Shaviro, supra note 4, at 317 ("Why implicitly encourage and reward such
risk-taking, by causing it to immunize tax benefits against legal challenge...? The
reason.., resembles that for placing the cookie jar in a kindergarten classroom on a
high shelf. We don't actually mean to encourage the five-year-olds to start stacking up
boxes and standing on chairs .... Rather, we simply figure that this way fewer of
them are likely to reach it when the teacher is not looking.").
51 A similar format - a bright-line rule coupled with a more open-ended inquiry
- is used by administrative authorities to combat wraparound insurance tax shelters.
See Charlene D. Luke, Beating the "Wrap": The Agency Effort to Control
Wraparound Insurance Tax Shelters, 25 VA. TAX REv. 129, 144-45 (2005).
[Vol. 27:783
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in a genuine economic transaction should be focused on its pre-tax
profit possibility. 2 Acceptance of this idea leads to the intuition that
financial assets and transactions are priced without regard to
individual tax consequences and that, therefore, pre-tax profit is a
good indicator of economic profit and the genuineness of a
transaction. This intuition, however, runs counter to principles of tax
capitalization and efficient markets.
The terms "implicit tax" and "tax capitalization" are used to
denote price changes that occur as the market takes explicit tax rates
into account. 3 Implicit taxes (or implicit tax subsidies) arise in
response to a tax benefit (or tax detriment) 4 conferred by Congress
on a particular type of transaction or investment product. An implicit
tax is not paid directly to Congress but is instead captured by another
party to the transaction." Tax clienteles then form as some investors
are able to earn inframarginal returns on implicitly taxed transactions
and assets.56
Tax-exempt municipal bonds provide the paradigmatic case of
implicit tax and tax clienteles. 7 Assume that a city wants to raise $10
million by issuing tax-exempt bonds. To simplify the example further,
assume that a taxable bond with the same level of risk as the tax-
58
exempt bond offers a fixed 10% return. Taxpayers in the 35%
52 Cf. Shaviro, supra note 4, at 317 ("[T]he key to a potentially appealing tax
shelter is that it reduce your taxable income by much more than it reduces your pre-
tax economic income.").
53 David A. Weisbach, Implications of Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REV. 373, 374
(1999) ("Implicit taxes are misnamed. Implicit taxes (or implicit subsidies) are not
taxes in the sense of the confiscation of resources by the government. They are simply
asset price adjustments in response to a tax benefit or detriment.").
54 See MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING
APPROACH 125 & n.4 (3d ed. 2005) (describing positive and negative implicit taxes);
Weisbach, supra note 53.
55 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 54, at 131.
56 See id. at 130; see also infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing tax
clientele formation).
57 See Charlotte Crane, Some Explicit Thinking About Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L.
REV. 339 (1999); Michael S. Knoll, Compaq Redux: Implicit Taxes and the Question of
Pre-tax Profit, 26 VA. TAX REV. 821, 834-35 (2007) (discussing municipal bond
interest rate as example of implicit taxation); Shaviro, supra note 4; Weisbach, supra
note 53; see also Calvin H. Johnson, Inefficiency Does Not Drive Out Inequity: Market
Equilibrium and Tax Shelters, 71 TAX NOTES 377, 381-85 (Apr. 15, 1996) (describing
tax capitalization).
58 Under market conditions, the return on both the corporate and tax-exempt
bond would vary until an equilibrium point was reached.
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bracket will be indifferent as between the tax-exempt bonds and risk-
adjusted taxable bonds only if the return on the tax-exempt bonds is
at least 6.5%." 35% bracket taxpayers may not, however, be the
investors setting the price (i.e., not the marginal investors). For
example, the city may need to set the rate at 7% in order to raise the
entire $10 million. At that interest rate, the 30% bracket taxpayers
would be the investors at the margin because they will be indifferent
as between the taxable bonds and the tax-exempt bonds.60 The
difference between the interest payable on the taxable bond and the
61tax-exempt bonds is the implicit tax.
The implicit tax will be the same for all taxpayers. In contrast,
explicit tax rates vary across rate brackets. This rate-bracket
difference will create preferences (tax clienteles) for particular
62investments. In the previous example, 35% bracket taxpayers will
prefer the tax-exempt bonds to the risk-adjusted taxable bonds. Even
after taking into account the implicit tax on the tax-exempt bonds,
these taxpayers will still come out ahead by choosing the tax-exempt
bonds over the risk-adjusted taxable bonds. The 35% bracket
taxpayers are the tax clientele for the tax-exempt bonds; in other
words, they are inframarginal rather than marginal investors with
respect to the bonds.
Various assumptions inform this theoretical model of implicit tax
and tax clientele formation. The central assumption, of course, is that
taxes are incorporated into asset prices; this assumption requires the
absence of potential impediments to price adjustment - impediments
such as irrational investors, information asymmetries, government
strictures, or market frictions.6' Further, quantifying the implicit tax
59 A $100 after-tax investment in municipal bonds at 6.5% would yield $106.50.
A $100 after-tax investment in 10% interest corporate bonds would also yield $106.50
($10 x 35% = $3.50; $10 - $3.50 = $6.50).
60 A $100 after-tax investment in 10% taxable bonds would yield $107 rather
than $106.50 ($10 x 30% = $3; $10 - $3 = $7).
61 The implicit tax can be described in other ways as well. See Knoll, supra note
57, at 833-34 ("There are three alternative ways to quantify the implicit tax on the
municipal bond. First, the implicit tax on the bond could be described as the increase
in the issue price of the bond .... Second, the implicit tax can be described as the
decrease in the payment on the bond at maturity .... Third, the implicit tax can be
described as a reduction in the interest rate paid by the municipal bond .... All three
methods are alternative, but equivalent, methods of describing the same
phenomenon.").
62 See SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 54, at 130 ("Taxpayers in the same tax
brackets are attracted to investments that are taxed similarly.").
63 See, e.g., Zvi BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 135-444 (6th ed. 2005); SCHOLES ET
[Vol. 27:783
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requires a comparison between the asset and a risk-adjusted
benchmark asset. Unless the benchmark asset and the test asset have
the same risk level, the implicit tax cannot be accura.ely determined.
64
To make the necessary risk adjustment, the riskiness of the test asset
and benchmark asset would need to be established using a pricing
61model, such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Choosing
one pricing model over another may dramatically alter the amount of
implicit tax measured.
A voluminous body of theoretical and empirical literature has
developed surrounding each of these points;66 even a short survey of
this literature is beyond the scope of this article. The literature
generally suggests that the broad, theoretical framework behind the
implicit tax and the formation of tax clienteles is reasonably sound,
although refinements regularly occur as ongoing empirical work either
supports or fails to support various details.6' As a practical matter, in
spite of the controversy in economics literature, sophisticated tax
planners have seemingly incorporated the idea of tax capitalization
into their tax planning strategies by using (or engineering) the
presence of implicit taxes or subsidies and tax clienteles into the
transaction to confound the courts' application of economic
substancei 8
AL., supra note 54; Douglas A. Shackelford & Terry Shevlin, Empirical Tax Research
in Accounting, 31 J. Accr. & ECON. 321, 346-59 (2001).
Professor Calvin Johnson has argued that full tax capitalization does not occur
and "should also not be expected ever to happen.., because the supply of alternative
tax shuns is too large to be absorbed by the demand from maximum tax bracket
investors." Johnson, supra note 57, at 383.
64 SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 54, at 127-30.
65 Id. at 127-30.
66 See, e.g., BODIE ET AL., supra note 63, at 281-445 (reviewing pricing models,
market efficiency, behavioral finance, and empirical evidence); SCHOLES ET AL., supra
note 54, at 131-32.
67 See, e.g., BODIE ET AL., supra note 63, at 415 ("Many of the implications of
these models [CAPM and arbitrage pricing theory] already have been accepted in
widely varying applications."); SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 54, at 131-32.
Some indirect evidence of this point is the substantial space devoted to
discussing implicit taxes, tax clienteles, and arbitrage strategies making use of these
phenomena in Taxes and Business Strategy: A Planning Approach, a book co-
authored by Nobel prize-winner (and tax shelter strategist) Myron S. Scholes.
SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 54; see Long Term Capital Holdings v. United States, 330
F. Supp. 2d 122, 128, 129 & n.6 (D. Conn. 2004) (using economic substance to deny
tax benefits to LTCH, one of whose founders was Myron Scholes), affd, 150 F. App'x
40 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Lee A. Sheppard, LTCM Case: What They Won't Do for
Money, Part 2, 2004 TNT 173-5 (Sept. 7, 2004) (describing Myron Scholes's
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Various tax scholars have called attention to the courts' failure to
account for implicit taxes.69 This failure could result in either too high
or too low a measure of pre-tax profit potential. Under-detection of
profit would occur if the taxpayer invested in a tax-favored asset. For
example, the profit potential on the 7% tax-exempt bond described
above does not reveal the pre-implicit tax return which is 10% - the
same pre-tax return as that on the benchmark, taxable bond. On the
other hand, failure to consider implicit tax subsidies results in over-
detection of pre-tax profit potential.70
For example, consider a hypothetical bond that is more highly
taxed relative to the 10% yield, risk-adjusted benchmark. Assume that
the marginal investor is a 30% bracket taxpayer and that a 10% tax
surcharge is imposed on the highly taxed bond. For this investor, the
after-tax return on the benchmark asset is 7%. In order to obtain the
same after-tax yield on the highly taxed bond, the bond would need to
yield 11 2/3% - an implicit tax subsidy of 1 2/3%. If both implicit
and explicit taxes are taken into account, the pre-tax yield on the
highly taxed bond is 10%.72 The clientele for transactions or assets
carrying implicit tax subsidies will be taxpayers with lower tax
brackets than the marginal investors. For example, a 25% bracket
taxpayer would earn slightly more on the highly taxed bond than she
would on the benchmark. If investing $100, a 25% bracket taxpayer
would earn $7.50 after-tax on the benchmark asset and $7.58
(rounded) on the bond carrying the 10% tax surcharge.
Any pre-tax inquiry will also fail to analyze the formation of tax
clienteles. Such knowledge may help sift difficult cases. For example, a
transaction that seemingly generates an insubstantial pre-tax return
should be deemed to satisfy objective economic substance if the
taxpayer's after-tax return is substantial and the difference between
the pre- and post-tax results arises because the taxpayer's rate bracket
places her in a position to attain inframarginal returns. In other words,
clienteles formed as a result of the statutory rate brackets (including
involvement in the Long Term Capital Holdings shelter litigation).
69 See generally Crane, supra note 57; Knoll, supra note 57; Shaviro, supra note
4; Weisbach, supra note 53.
70 This is essentially what occurred in the Compaq transaction. See infra notes
138-139 and accompanying text; see also Knoll, supra note 57, at 839 (explaining that
after taking an implicit tax subsidy into account "[t]he transactions in Compaq and
IES Industries do not generate pre-tax profits").
71 X- 0.3X- 0.1X = 0.07; solving for Xyields 0.11667.
7 See, e.g., Knoll, supra note 57, at 836-37; see also Shackelford & Shevlin, supra
note 63.
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statutory exemptions from U.S. tax) should be considered to have
been intended by Congress. As discussed in the next Part, my
proposal builds on this conclusion.
IV. PROPOSED OBJECTIVE ECONOMIC SUBSTANCE INQUIRY
The objective substance framework proposed in this article
consists of three components.73 First, the suspect transaction would be
subject to a comparables test. The transaction would be deemed to
satisfy the objective substance inquiry if the transaction survived
scrutiny under the comparables test. Second, if the transaction fails
the comparables test, the burden would be on the taxpayer to show
that the nonstandard return was more likely than not the result of a
naturally occurring tax clientele. Finally, if no suitable comparable
were found, preventing application of the comparables test, a more
open-ended inquiry into other characteristics of the transaction would
73 My proposal shares common elements with three other proposed reforms to
the profits inquiry.
Michael Knoll has recommended that the economic substance doctrine be
applied with a pre-implicit tax, pre-explicit tax profit standard in order to sharpen
court analysis of profit potential on economic substance. While his article is written
with Compaq in mind, his basic point about the failures of the current state of the pre-
tax inquiry is of more general applicability. Knoll, supra note 57. This would require
quantifying the amount or rate of the implicit tax (or implicit subsidy) - though such
a task would be less difficult for shelters designed to use implicit taxes to generate the
appearance of pre-tax profits. This is essentially what happened in Compaq and IES.
See id. at 847-51.
Mitchell Kane appears to be the only other commentator who has advocated use
of a post-tax profit test. His proposal is brief, and is tied primarily to his analysis of
the Compaq case. He looks not only to what the taxpayer receives, after taxes, but
also to what the government loses, after taxes: "I would propose that in transactions
involving the acquisition of assets that will produce income subject to foreign
withholding tax, the economic substance test should be applied not merely by
comparing the pre-tax and after-tax profit of the taxpayer but also by determining
whether there is any after-tax profit from the transaction in excess of the hit taken by
the Treasury." Kane, supra note 4.
Joseph Bankman has discussed the possibility of a comparables approach,
though in the context of a pre-tax inquiry: "One plausible rule would be to require
only the bare minimum present value expected return required by similarly situated
taxpayers for investments with similar risk characteristics. The rule could be made less
ambiguous by eliminating the 'similarly situated' requirement. In that case, a taxpayer
could justify its position so long as it could show that some taxpayers, somewhere,
would have found the pretax return it had received to be attractive." Bankman, supra
note 6, at 23-24. He notes the difficulty in making such a comparison pre-tax because
of the problem of implicit taxes. See id. at 24.
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apply.
These components are examined in greater detail below and are
followed by a consideration of potential objections to the proposal




The economic concept informing the proposed comparables test
is the "law of one price" - the idea "that if two assets are equivalent
in all economically relevant respects, then they should have the same
market price."74 The literature on implicit taxes and tax clienteles adds
the proviso that "the same market price" works only if the two assets
are compared (1) before all taxes, including implicit taxes and implicit
tax subsidies, or (2) after all taxes as measured from the viewpoint of
the price-setting investors - that is, the marginal investors.
For example, in a competitive market, a tax-exempt bond and an
economically equivalent taxable corporate bond will have the same
return before all taxes and will also have the same return for the
marginal investor when compared after-tax. If the marginal investor is
in the 30% rate bracket, then an equilibrium point could be reached
when the tax-exempt bond yields 7% and the taxable corporate bond
yields 10%. If the return on this tax-exempt bond is determined
before the implicit 3% tax, its return would be 10% - the same as
that on the corporate bond. After-tax, both investments would yield
7% to the individual in the 30% tax bracket.
As this example illustrates, use of an after-tax comparison
automatically takes into account implicit taxes and subsidies. In
addition, risk is incorporated into the proposed comparables test
through the requirement of comparing the suspect transaction to an
economically equivalent market transaction. Thus, the proposed
comparables test makes use of risk and return to determine economic
substance but it avoids the problem of setting an absolute minimum
level of return or risk.75 The proposed comparables test, however,
makes only a rough cut, risk-adjusted comparison between the suspect
76transaction and a market transaction. It does not address the
74 BODIE ET AL., supra note 63, at 349.
75 See generally Joint Committee on Taxation, supra note 1.
76 BODIE ET AL., supra note 63, at 866. This is somewhat analogous to risk
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problem of inframarginal returns resulting solely from the progressive
rate structure.
To return to the example of the tax-exempt and taxable bond, an
investor in the 35% tax bracket would have different after-tax returns
on the two assets - 7% on the tax-exempt bond and 6.5% on the
taxable bond. This additional return - the inframarginal return - is
available solely because of this investor's marginal tax bracket. As
previously indicated , an important assumption underlying the
proposed framework is that Congress intends taxpayers to obtain
inframarginal returns naturally arising from the progressive rate
bracket structure. Thus, if the suspect transaction has an after-tax
return that is substantially higher than the range available on
comparable transactions, the taxpayer would have the opportunity to
overcome the presumption that the transaction lacked objective
economic substance. The taxpayer would need to show that the
discrepancy was the result of the taxpayer being the member of a
naturally forming tax clientele. This would take the form of a more
open-ended inquiry into the transaction, as described in Part IV.B.2.
If the suspect transaction yields a return that is substantially
similar to the comparable transaction, the taxpayer would satisfy the
proposed objective inquiry without further government contest. Here,
the underlying assumption is that a rational taxpayer would not
bother with a tax shelter earning an after-tax return that is no betterS 78
than that available on an economically equivalent market transaction
- particularly when the risks of tax litigation are considered. Yet,
even if the suspect transaction survives the comparables test, it may
nevertheless be, colloquially speaking, a "tax shelter." For example,
before entering into a suspect transaction, a taxpayer might
reasonably believe based on promoter representations that the return
on the transaction will substantially exceed the return on an
adjustments made to assess the performance of portfolio managers:
The simplest and most popular way to adjust returns for portfolio risk is to
compare rates of return with those of other investment funds with similar
risk characteristics. For example, high-yield bond portfolios are grouped
into one "universe..... Then the ... average returns of each fund within
the universe are ordered, and each portfolio manager receives a percentile
ranking depending on relative performance with the comparison universe.
Id.
77 See supra Part III.B (final paragraph).
78 See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing similar rationale
underlying minimum profit potential hurdles).
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economically comparable market transaction. Nonetheless, under the
proposed test the suspect transaction would survive the objective
economic substance inquiry if it in fact yields an after-tax return in
line with that available on the comparable transaction. Such a result
may raise equity and efficiency concerns since relatively few taxpayers
have the luxury of engaging in the tax shelter game and all actions in
this game trigger some level of deadweight cost.7 9
Yet, it is also problematic to use objective economic substance to
halt transactions that end up looking like market transactions.
Objective economic substance, even as it is currently framed by the
courts, is about distinguishing between transactions that actually affect
the taxpayer's economic position from those that only do so through
tax effects.8° While beyond the scope of this article, the subjective
inquiry of the economic substance doctrine might mitigate concern
about equity and efficiency. In addition, the economic substance
doctrine is far from being the only government tool available to
81litigate against suspect transactions
2. Fact-Finding Tasks
Courts must act carefully in defining comparables and making
comparisons. The factfinder will need to locate the boundaries of the
suspect transaction (including the problems of financing and hedging),
calculate the after-tax return on the suspect transaction, decide on a
range of economically equivalent comparables, and determine
whether the after-tax return on the suspect transaction substantially
outstrips that available on the comparables range.
a. Transaction Boundaries
Under the current pre-tax profit inquiry, courts must already
determine transaction boundaries; the proposed test would not alter
the current approach to this assessment. In determining transaction
boundaries, courts generally take into account factors such as
79 See, e.g., SLEMROD & BAKIJA, supra note 42, at 280 (describing tax shelter
efforts as "economically wasteful").
80 See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir.
2001) (observing that the economic substance doctrine "has few bright lines, but 'it is
clear that transactions whose sole function is to produce tax deductions are
substantive shams"').
81 See Hariton, supra note 6, at 237-41 (describing various means through which
suspect transactions may be challenged).
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chronology, formal and informal agreements, and relationships among
the parties.82 Financing and hedging arrangements that are directly
implicated by such factors should be considered part of the suspect
transaction." Hedging and financing unrelated to the transaction
should not be taken into account, although these agreements may well
have some bearing on the actual risks and profitability of the suspect
transaction.
Tracing debt and hedging to a particular transaction can be
particularly difficult since debt is essentially fungible and hedging may
be difficult to find. At the same time, however, pre-packaged tax
shelters frequently come with suggestions and directions on financing
and hedging.84 While such packaging may grow in sophistication, a
direct link between the suspect transaction and particular financing or
hedging would still be present - if perhaps difficult to detect. If,
however, a taxpayer finances or hedges outside a pre-packaged shelter
or crafts its own shelter entirely, drawing transaction boundaries may
well prove impossible. As a result, "home-grown" shelters will be less
susceptible to resolution under the comparables approach."' This is,
however, also true for current formulations of the objective economic
substance inquiry.
b. After-Tax Calculation
The after-tax return must be determined both for the suspect
transaction and any comparables. In making the after-tax calculation
for the suspect transaction, the taxpayer's claimed tax treatment
would be used. The marginal tax rate selected for testing the
comparables would be the taxpayer's marginal rate bracket
determined without regard to the claimed tax benefits of the suspect
transaction. For example, if the suspect transaction generated $1001 of
losses and the last dollar moves the taxpayer from a 35% rate bracket
to a 30% rate, the taxpayer will have saved $350.30 in taxes since she
will avoid the 35% rate on $1000 of income and 30% rate on $1 of
income. The after-tax return on the comparables would also need to
be calculated at these rates and in the same proportion in order to
82 See Keinan, supra note 6, at A-83.
83 See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254, 279 (1999)
("[T]he overall transaction, of which the debt is a part, must have economic substance
before interest can be deducted."), affd, 254 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2001).
The two case studies discussed in Part V both were structured with pre-
planned financing and risk hedging.
85 With thanks to Marty McMahon for suggestion of this term.
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yield an equivalent comparison.
For transactions that take place across multiple tax years, an
averaging method would need to be selected. Consistent application
of a calculation methodology is perhaps more important than the
particular method chosen. One possible method is a time-weighted,
86
arithmetic average of the after-tax rate of return. Such a method
should work especially well for tax avoidance transactions of short
duration.87 Under this method, the after-tax return is calculated for
each tax year (the standard tax period) and converted into a rate of
return against the investment base. The rates for each year are added
18together then divided by the number of years. This is, however, just
one possible calculation method; the characteristics of the suspect
transaction should be taken into account when choosing a method.
The problems of debt and transaction costs remain to be
considered. The after-tax rate of return depends on how the
investment base is defined. It is proposed that the investment base
• 89
should include related financing. Failure to include financing would
distort the comparison between the rate on the suspect transaction
and that on the comparables. Including debt in the investment base is
also consistent with the general incorporation of debt into the
calculation of tax basis.90 High transaction costs (i.e., promoter fees)
are another feature of the tax avoidance landscape and should also be
taken into account in determining the after-tax return.9' Often, the
taxpayer will have deducted the fees or capitalized them into the
transaction so that the claimed tax consequences automatically
86 BODIE ET AL., supra note 63, at 862-63 (describing calculations for time-
weighted, arithmetic average returns).
87 Many tax shelters are likely to be of short duration since transactions of
longer duration are more likely to carry with them greater risk and thus are less
attractive.
88 To give a simple example, assume that an investment of $100 yields after-tax
$10 in the Year 1 and $8 in Year 2, and the after-tax rates of return are 10% and 8%
for Year 1 and Year 2, respectively. The arithmetic average is 9% - 18% divided by
2 years.
89 See supra Part IV.A.2.a (discussion of the difficulty in tracing related
financing).
90 See, e.g., Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 3-11 (1947) (basis equal to
amount of debt); see also Johnson, supra note 57, at 378 ("[D]ebt should be included
in basis unless there is a good reason for it not to be.").
91 Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74
U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 609 (2007) ("A tax shelter promoter who develops a new scheme
that is likely to work can earn large fees .... ").
[Vol. 27:783
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include adjustments for transaction fees. 92 The after-tax return on a
comparable would need to be adjusted to account for the standard
transaction costs associated with the selected comparable.
The presence of unrecognized gains and losses presents
additional, more difficult, measurement problems. These
measurement problems may be further complicated if the transaction
has been unwound by the taxpayer or audited by Internal Revenue
Service (Service) agents before its completion. In such a situation,
future returns may also need to be considered. In many cases,
incorporating future returns may not be difficult since multiple-year
tax avoidance techniques are frequently characterized by stable cash
flows and relatively remote contingencies. 93
c. Market Comparables
The word "market" is used to signify that the comparable is
available through a reasonably efficient market about which
information is reasonably accessible. This definition is motivated by
two considerations. First, in order to exploit the identity of returns on
economically equivalent transactions or assets, the market must be
relatively well functioning. Second, in order to make the comparison,
sufficient access to information about the market must be available.
Economic equivalence would be determined by matching up
factors that contribute to expected and actual rates of return.94 The
precise identity and weight of the factors that contribute to return
variance is the subject of much ongoing scholarship, 95 potentially
making economic equivalence seem a problematic method to deny tax
benefits. In spite of similar concerns, however, controversial economic
models are routinely used in the financial world, for example, in rating
portfolio manager performance.96 In addition, the universe of
comparables for a transaction suspected of being a tax shelter may
frequently look most similar to the low-risk world of simple debt
transactions (with perhaps some remote opportunity of an equity-type
92 See infra note 135 (describing how fees were capitalized into the Compaq
transaction).
93 See, e.g., Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 254, 262 (1999)
(detailing projections on corporate-owned life insurance policies), affd, 254 F.3d 1313
(11th Cir. 2001).
94 See BODIE ET AL., supra note 63.
95 See, e.g., id. at 415-44 (reviewing empirical evidence testing capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) and other pricing models).
96 Id. at 415; see also supra note 74 (describing technique).
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gain at the end, included in order to confuse courts). The factors that
determine interest rates on simple debt are not especially complicated
or controversial (e.g., loan term, credit considerations, market interest
rates, and inflationary expectations), and public information about
interest rates is readily available. Even when dealing with more
complex debt securities, the factors that contribute to variance in yield
to maturity are fairly well settled.97
Current tax rules in other areas provide some additional support
for a switch to a comparables approach to economic substance. For
example, comparables are utilized in setting the terms of advance
pricing agreements entered into by taxpayers with the Service and in
98litigating transfer pricing cases. In addition, when deciding general
substance-over-form cases, courts frequently give consideration to
how parties would have operated if they had been negotiating at arm's
length.99 As discussed in Part II above, the comparables method
proposed in this article is essentially an extension of this approach,
though it operates by selecting a range of market benchmarks against
which to assess the suspect transaction.
B. Factor-Based Inquiries
1. Rebutting the Presumption Triggered by Comparables Test Failure
After failure of the comparables test, a taxpayer would have the
opportunity to rebut the resulting presumption that her suspect
transaction lacked objective economic substance. The taxpayer would
need to present evidence that the higher-than-market return was
related to a standard tax clientele arising by normal operation of the
progressive rate bracket system. The two principal questions would be
(1) the extent to which the high return arose as a result of a tax
bracket differential and (2) the extent to which the tax bracket
differential was naturally occurring.
Discerning whether the return arose as a result of tax bracket
97 See BODIE ET AL., supra note 63, at 520-23.
98 Advanced pricing agreements are negotiated under authority granted under
section 482. Through these negotiations, taxpayers are able to establish in advance
that payments for transfers between commonly controlled entities will be respected.
See John P. Warner, Transfer Pricing: Introductory Materials, 886 TAX MGMT.
PORTFOLIO (BNA) (2007).
99 See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States., 398 F.2d 694, 697 (3d Cir. 1968)
(using arm's length transaction as factor to measure the "economic reality" of a
payment from shareholder to corporation).
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differential would require an examination of the tax profiles of the
counterparties in the transaction. For purposes of illustration,
consider again the tax-exempt and taxable bonds examples previously
described.' °° Assume that the suspect transaction is investment in a
7% tax-exempt bond and that the comparable is a taxable, 10% bond.
After taxes, a 35% tax bracket individual would earn more (7%) on
the tax-exempt bond than on the taxable bond (6.5%). Even if the
tax-exempt return were considered a "substantial" departure from the
comparable, this individual would be able to demonstrate that this
increased return arose naturally because of the difference between her
tax bracket and that of the price-setting investors.
The phrase "naturally occurring" is admittedly ambiguous. Courts
would look generally to whether the differential was pre-engineered
in some way or whether the transaction would have yielded the same
benefit to anyone in the same tax bracket as the challenged taxpayer.
Relevant facts would include, for example, the presence of a promoter
and the relationship between the counterparties and the taxpayer.
2. Lack of Suitable Comparable
In the event that a suitable market comparable is not available,
courts would turn to a more open-ended inquiry into the suspect
transaction. This inquiry would focus on whether the claimed after-tax
result more likely than not arose from economic circumstances other
than tax manipulation. Thus, the initial focus would remain on the
after-tax result claimed by the taxpayer. 101
This factor-based inquiry would begin with an assessment of any
comparables previously suggested by the parties. Although the
suggested comparables would already have been determined by the
court to be unsuitable for the purpose of applying the presumption of
the comparables test, they may still provide some indication of the
likelihood that the claimed benefits arose in an economically
meaningful way. Where a suitable market comparable is not available,
consideration would be given to the factors that would go into
determining price as between parties operating at arm's length.'0
2
100 See supra notes 57-63, 74-77 and accompanying text.
101 This inquiry is similar to Mitchell Kane's overall proposal. See supra note 73;
see also Hariton, supra note 6 ("The issue is not whether the transactions in question
had tax-independent purposes, but rather whether they had tax-independent
consequences, and whether those consequences were significant enough to rise to the
level of economic substance.").
102 See infra Part V.B (using such an approach to assess the Black & Decker
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Other relevant evidence would include: the presence of nontax,
market frictions or asymmetries; the ease with which other taxpayers
could have entered into the transaction; the presence or absence of a
known tax-shelter promoter; the degree of dependence of the after-
tax return on particular tax attributes of the taxpayer or counterparty;
the timing and circumstances surrounding the creation of those tax
attributes; the degree of leverage and the taxpayer's out-of-pocket
investment; the level of transaction risk; and the pre-tax profit
potential.
While most of these factors are self-explanatory, the presence of
pre-tax profit requires additional explanation since its inclusion may
seem to threaten a return to the problems discussed in Part III. In the
proposed inquiry, however, pre-tax profit is but one of several
considerations. In addition, the pre-tax profit (actual and potential)
should be compared to the post-tax return. The comparison would
focus on whether the two measures bear a more-or-less standard
relationship to each other. For example, taxes generally cause gain
transactions to become less profitable rather than more so. Similarly,
if the taxpayer claims to have simply lost on a highly speculative
transaction and takes a deduction, the post-tax loss should be smaller
than the pre-tax loss. In addition, if the pre-tax profit return (actual or
potential) is equivalent to the return available on a low- or no-risk
asset, the question should be asked whether it was objectively rational
for the investor to enter the suspect transaction rather than simply
invest directly in low-risk assets.
C. Framework Effects
This Part briefly addresses potential concerns and questions that
may be raised by the proposed framework.
1. After-Tax Approach
A potential taxpayer concern is that the framework operates by
• • 103
looking at suspect transactions with the benefit of hindsight. The
transaction).
103 In its use of hindsight, the proposed framework is similar to the tax shelter
reform proposal put forward by Professor Marvin A. Chirelstein and Professor
Lawrence A. Zelenak, supra note 49. They write that "[t]he most promising
approach" to dealing with contemporary shelters "is to create a hindsight rule, one
that emphasizes outcomes, actual or readily foreseeable." Id. at 1952. Their proposed
method would, however, eliminate the economic substance doctrine altogether and
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framework is not, however, a fully ex post process since the selection
of a comparable will take into account the risks embedded in the
suspect transaction. Still, current approaches to objective economic
substance contain more emphasis on ex ante elements.
As a general matter, the tax system is applied to transactions as
they actually occur - often to the benefit of taxpayers. For example,
individuals are taxed on the income they actually earn, not on the
income stream they would earn if utilizing their full earning potential;
and the realization requirement allows taxpayers to wait to recognize
gain on an asset until the sale or exchange of that asset. Since the tax
law usually focuses on actual results, arguably, the question should be
whether there is sufficient justification for the current approach to
profit in the objective economic substance inquiry. The concern over
the use of hindsight in evaluating tax avoidance schemes appears to
relate directly to the consequences if the scheme is found to be
illegitimate. In other words, because disallowance is a harsh measure,
taxpayers want full consideration given to the various potentialities of
the transaction.
As discussed in Part III.A, full consideration of every possible
outcome would present a significant problem to courts and would
provide taxpayers with the opportunity to confuse the true nature of
the transaction. The proposed framework contains various safeguards
to prevent disallowance of nonabusive transactions. Taxpayers would
be able to present evidence on a range of comparables and would
have the opportunity to address a failure on the comparables test.
Finally, as discussed in Part II, the framework would be applied only
to transactions in which the taxpayer took a nonobvious route to
benefits and after other evaluative tools had been found lacking.
would instead contain just two rules: (1) deductions would only be allowed "for losses
substantially in excess of any measurable reduction to the taxpayer's net worth" and
(2) no deduction or exclusion would "be allowed through the allocation of
noneconomic income to a tax-indifferent party." Id.
The framework proposed in this article assumes that the economic substance
doctrine in some form or another is here to stay. Although an in-depth discussion of
whether the economic substance doctrine should be retained is beyond the scope of
this article, this article does take the position that the objective economic substance
doctrine in its current formulations has yet to reach the optimal blend of "rule" and
"standard." Supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
For a more developed discussion of the proposal by Professors Chirelstein and
Zelenak, see Professor Galle's article, supra note 2, at 364-66.
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2. Taxpayer Sophistication
As discussed in Parts III.B and IV, the proposed comparables test
requires reliance on economic assumptions about competitive markets
and tax capitalization. Taxpayers may be concerned that these
assumptions are not sufficiently free from controversy so as to justify
their use in a tax litigation tool. As previously discussed, however,
these economic assumptions are used with frequency in the financial
world (and sometimes used to craft tax shelters). This concern is also
mitigated by the general profile of the taxpayers involved in
transactions sufficiently problematic to be investigated under
economic substance. Such taxpayers tend to be wealthy and highly
sophisticated (or at least have access to highly sophisticated advisers).
These taxpayers would likely be able to make a meaningful response
as to the appropriateness of a particular comparable suggested by the
government.
The sophistication of the taxpayers involved in tax avoidance
schemes also raises the question of tax shelter evolution should the
proposed framework be adopted. At least two changes to the
construction of tax avoidance techniques seem likely. First, taxpayers
would turn their attention to methods for satisfying the comparables
inquiry. This might be accomplished by a more careful blurring of
transaction boundaries and protracted factual battles over after-tax
return calculations and selection of appropriate comparables.
Attempts might be made to pre-select (or possibly even create) a
comparable and build enough parallel points into the suspect
transaction so as to create a ready-made argument for a favorable
outcome under the objective inquiry. Courts and administrative
agency personnel would need to watch for these or similar
developments. Agency personnel might have to change the scope of
audits (or reportable transaction requirements)'0 to uncover such
tactics, and some concepts, such as the definition of transaction, might
need to be narrowed.
This article has largely stayed away from discussion of the
subjective prong of the economic substance doctrine and will do so
again here except to observe that the proposed framework's second
likely effect on tax shelter construction is that taxpayers would claim
subjective motivations that helped them argue against particular
comparables and bolster claims under the factor-based inquiry.
'04 See Code sections 6011, 6111, and 6112, and the regulations relating to these
provisions.
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Taxpayers might, for example, assert that they entered into the
suspect transaction because they found a unique, golden economic
opportunity for which no comparable would be available.
Apart from spurring possible changes to tax shelter construction
methods, under the proposed framework, taxpayers may also make
different information requests from would-be tax promoters. Instead
of asking how much a particular transaction would save the taxpayer
in taxes, they might shift to asking how much they can expect to earn
after taxes are paid and how that return compares to the return
available on more common, less suspect transactions. Such a
comparison may (though this is perhaps wishful thinking) cause some
taxpayers to reflect more seriously on whether entering into a tax
shelter is really worth it.
3. Adoption of Framework
An additional question is the extent to which courts could adopt
the proposed framework in the absence of congressional or
administrative authority. In some jurisdictions, the economic
substance doctrine may be stated ambiguously enough for lower
courts to adopt the proposed approach. Because the proposed
framework is tied to the general substance-over-form test, there may
be further room for courts to adopt a comparables approach. In fact,
two court decisions have already incorporated a general substance-
over-form test into their objective economic substance decisions. At
the appellate level, the Supreme Court's offerings on economic
substance are so thin as to provide almost no direction. °7 As a result,
105 See Kane, supra note 4 (suggesting that language in Rice's Toyota World could
be used to support an approach comparing pre- and post-tax results); see also Rice's
Toyota World v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 184, 203 (1983) (analyzing the transaction in
terms of a "realistic opportunity for economic profit").
106 Bail Bonds by Marvin Nelson, Inc. v. Commissioner, 820 F.2d 1543, 1549 (9th
Cir. 1987) ("The economic substance factor involves a broader examination of
whether the substance of a transaction reflects its form, and whether from an
objective standpoint the transaction was likely to produce economic benefits aside
from a tax deduction."); Johnson v. United States., 32 Fed. Cl. 709, 717 (1995) ("The
determination of whether a transaction has economic substance is essentially a two
part analysis: (1) whether the substance of the transaction is reflected in its form, and
(2) whether the transaction had a reasonable objective possibility of providing a profit
aside from tax benefits.").
107 Cf. Amandeep S. Grewal, Economic Substance & The Supreme Court, 116
TAX NOTES 969 (Sept. 10, 2007) ("[T]he lower courts' creation of an economic
substance doctrine contradicts Supreme Court precedent, has caused deep circuit
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courts would have some room to add the proposed approach to
objective economic substance, although in some jurisdictions,
appellate courts would have to refine or even directly overturn prior
approaches of their own making.
V. CASE STUDIES
This part analyzes two tax avoidance cases for purposes of
illustrating how a post-tax inquiry would operate. The first case is
Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, a case that has generated
a great deal of discussion. This case provides an example of a pre-
packaged transaction that would likely fail the comparables inquiry.
The second case is the more recent Black & Decker Corp. v. United
States.1°9 It is an example of a situation where it may be necessary to
apply the factor-based inquiry because no suitable comparable is
available.
A. Compaq v. Commissioner
1. Transaction Details
The Compaq case"O involved a relatively simple transaction, and
one that Congress responded to by enacting a statutory fix."1 In July
splits, and is inconsistent with well-settled rules of statutory interpretation.").
Some portions of the Supreme Court's (infamous) opinion in Frank Lyon Co. v.
United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978), might be stretched to support a comparables
method - for example, the Court's emphasis on the "competitive situation" and
"multiple-party transaction." Id. at 582-83. For discussion of Frank Lyon, see
Wolfman, supra note 29.
108 Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 113 T.C. 214 (1999), rev'd, 277
F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); see, e.g., Hariton, supra note 6, 273 ("I am not sure Compaq
is getting away with enough in this transaction for a court to disallow the results for
lack of economic substance...."); David P. Hariton, The Compaq Case, Notice 98-5,
and Tax Shelters: The Theory Is All Wrong, 2002 TNT 19-30 (Jan. 29, 2002); Kane,
supra note 4; Klein & Stark, supra note 4; Knoll, supra note 57; Daniel N. Shaviro,
Economic Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES
221 (July 10, 2000); Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The Fifth Circuit Gets It
Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner, 26 TAX NOTES INT'L 191 (Apr. 15, 2002).
109 Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 2006).
110 Compaq, 113 T.C. 214. The IES case is essentially similar. IES Industries, Inc.
v. United States, 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001), rev'g No. C97-206, 1999 WL 973538
(N.D. Iowa Sept. 22, 1999).
il Section 901(k) was added by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 to restrict the
dividend stripping technique used by Compaq. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L.
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1992, Compaq recognized $231.7 million of long-term capital gain on
an unrelated transaction.'12 (Numbers in the main text are rounded to
the nearest $100,000 unless otherwise noted.) Twenty-First Securities
Corporation (Twenty-First) contacted Compaq and proposed a
transaction that would generate capital losses to offset that gain."'
Compaq spent minimal time and effort reviewing the transaction
details before agreeing to Twenty-First's proposal. 114 The transaction
consisted of three steps: (1) purchase of American Depository
Receipts (ADRs)"5 in the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Royal
Dutch), a Netherlands corporation, when the ADRs were trading with
dividend; (2) re-sale of the ADRs ex dividend; and (3) collection of
the dividend.
No. 105-34, § 1053(a), 111 Stat. 788, 941-43. Generally, the foreign tax credit is
available for foreign taxes withheld on dividends only if the dividend recipient held
the underlying stock for at least 16 days during the "31-day period beginning on the
date which is 15 days before the date on which such share becomes ex-dividend."
I.R.C. § 901(k)(1)(A)(i).
One purpose of this rule is to require taxpayers to assume the risks of ownership
before becoming eligible for the tax benefits tied to being the stock owner on the
record date. In addition, the increase and decrease in stock price caused by the
declaration of the dividend and passing of the ex dividend date will be significantly
less pronounced as result of this enforced holding period.
112 Compaq, 113 T.C. at 215.
.. Id. The Tax Court describes this company as "an investment firm specializing
in arbitrage transactions." Id.
114 Id. at 216-17. On September 15, 1992, the assistant treasurer - James J.
Tempesta - of Compaq met with representatives from Twenty-First "[i]n a meeting
that lasted approximately an hour." Id. at 216. Two transactions were proposed -
one called the "Dividend Reinvestment Arbitrage Program," the other making use of
American Depository Receipts (ADR). Id. at 215. On September 16, 1992 - the
same day the transaction was completed - Compaq notified Twenty-First that it
would go forward with the ADR transaction. The research was minimal: "Tempesta
did not perform a cash-flow analysis before agreeing to take part in the ADR
transaction. Rather, Tempesta's investigation of Twenty-First and the ADR
transaction, in general, was limited to telephoning a reference provided by Twenty-
First and reviewing a spreadsheet provided by Jacoby [of Twenty-First] that analyzed
the transaction." Id. at 216. As to the Royal Dutch ADRs purchased, "Tempesta's
research.., was limited to reading in the Wall Street Journal that Royal Dutch
declared a dividend and to observing the various market prices of Royal Dutch
ADR's." Id. at 217.
115 "An ADR... is a trading unit issued by a trust, which represents ownership
of stock in a foreign corporation that is deposited with the trust. ADR's are the
customary form of trading foreign stocks on U.S. stock exchanges ... " Id. at 215.
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a. Purchase of ADRs
Compaq purchased 10 million Royal Dutch ADRs on September
16, 1992, through twenty-three separate transactions that occurred
over the course of an hour. 16 Each sale was carried out with "next
day" settlement terms.11 7 Thus, closing would take place on September
17, 1992.1 8 The floor brokers executing the trades were instructed to
complete a trade "only if the prices selected were within the range of
the current market prices." 1 9 Each purchase (and re-sale) was done
pursuant to the rules of the New York stock exchange"O and none of
the trades were broken up.1 The seller of the ADRs - a company
called Arthur J. Gallagher and Company (Gallagher) - was also a
client of Twenty-First. 122 Compaq did not know the identity of the
seller. 123
The aggregate purchase price for the ADRs was $887.6 million.
Compaq claimed a tax basis of $888.5 million as a result of capitalizing
certain fees. In this case, the "blended price per share equaled the
actual market price plus the net dividend., 124 The Netherlands
withheld a 15% tax on the gross dividend. Thus, the price paid by
Compaq was equal to market price plus 85% of the gross dividend.
Compaq's purchase price indicates that the seller was unable to use
the U.S. foreign tax credit to offset the Netherlands withholding tax.
In other words, the seller, Gallagher, was indifferent as between (1)
keeping the stock, receiving the gross dividend, and paying the
116 Id. at 217.
117 Id.
118 These terms were pursuant to NYSE rule 64. Id.
119 Id.
120 The specific rule was NYSE rule 76, which "required an open out-cry for each
cross-trade, and NYSE rule 72 allowed other traders on the floor or the 'specialist'
responsible for making the cross-trades to break up the transaction by taking all or
part of the trade." Id. at 218.
121 Id. ("[Flor cross-trades priced at the market price, there was no incentive to
break up the transaction.").
122 Id. at 217 ("Gallagher had been a client of Twenty-First since 1985 and
participated in various investment strategies developed by Twenty-First over the
years."). In the IES case, the court described the sellers of the ADRs as "tax-exempt
entities, such as pension funds. However, such entities were exempt only from U.S.
taxes; they still were required to pay the 15% foreign tax on any ADR dividends
collected. Because they owed no U.S. tax, they could not benefit from the foreign tax
credit." IES Industries, Inc. v. United States, 253 F.3d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 2001).
"' Compaq, 113 T.C. at 217.
124 Id.
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Netherlands withholding tax and (2) selling the stock for market price
plus 85% of the gross dividend.15 If persons able to use the U.S. tax
credit had set the price, the price would have approached the market
price plus the gross dividend. Thus, Compaq's purchase price carried
with it an implicit tax subsidy.
On the September 17th settlement date, Gallagher's account with
Bear Stearns & Co. (Bear Stearns) 26 was credited with the purchase
127price, net of Securities and Exchange Commission fees (SEC fees) .
Compaq paid the purchase price with money loaned to it through its
margin account with Bear Stearns. Compaq opened this margin
account on September 17, 1992, and transferred to it $20.6 million.128
b. Re-sale of ADRs
Each of the twenty-three separate purchases Compaq made from
Gallagher was accompanied by a re-sale of the same ADRs back to
Gallagher, but with the settlement specified to occur on September
21, 1992 - 5 days after the September 16 agreement on terms.
Compaq sold the ADRs for a price of $868.4 million, before
adjustments for commissions and fees."' With adjustments for fees,
Compaq reported an amount realized for the sale of $867.9 million,
yielding a reported capital loss of $20.7 million.' 3
125 See also IES, 253 F.3d at 352 ("The purchase price of the securities was equal
to market price plus 85% of the ADRs' expected gross dividends, that is, the same
amount the ADR lender would have received after foreign tax was withheld had it
been the record owner entitled to payment of the dividends.").
126 For decades Bear Stearns was "a leading global investment banking, securities
trading and brokerage firm." Bear Stearns, http://www.bearstearns.com/sitewide/
ourfirm/index.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2008). The "guiding principles" of "respect,
integrity, meritocracy, innovation and a commitment to philanthropy... serve as
[the] blueprint for the way that [they] do business." Id. In March 2008, the Federal
Reserve intervened to prevent the collapse of Bear Stearns and facilitate a takeover
by JP Morgan Chase. See Edmund L. Andrews, In Sweeping Move, Fed Backs Buyout
and Wall St. Loans., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at Al.
127 These fees totaled $29,586. Compaq, 113 T.C. at 218. Gallagher was
reimbursed for these fees; it is not clear why they were reimbursed or who reimbursed
the company. Id.
128 Id. On September 18, Compaq also transferred $16,866,571. This amount was
transferred back to it on the same day. This transfer/re-transfer was done to satisfy
margin requirements - basically "to demonstrate [Compaq's] financial ability to
pay." Id.
129 Id.
130 Id. at 219. Probably not coincidentally, the reported capital loss is only $820
more than the deposit made by Compaq to its Bear Stearns account. Id.
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c. Dividend
The dividend declared by Royal Dutch was payable to those who
were shareholders of record on September 18, 1992.1" As a
shareholder of record for that date, Compaq was entitled to a $22.5
million dividend on its 10 million Royal Dutch shares. 32 The
Netherlands withheld $3.4 million in taxes. When Royal Dutch paid
the dividend on October 2, 1992, it deposited a net dividend of $19.2
million into Compaq's margin account at Bear Stearns. 33 The pre-tax,
gross economic loss (loss on sale plus fees) experienced by Compaq
was $20.7 million - $1.5 million larger than the net dividend and $1.9
million smaller than the gross dividend. Compaq claimed that the
proper comparison was between this economic loss and the gross
dividend for an expected and received pre-tax profit of $1.9 million.
d. Fees
The court lists three fees paid by Compaq (rounded to the nearest
$1000): (1) SEC fees of $29,000; (2) commissions to Twenty-First of
$999,000; and (3) $458,000 interest paid to Bear Stearns on the
borrowing through the margin account of the purchase price of the
ADRs.134 The total transaction costs were approximately $1.5 million.
All of these costs were capitalized into Compaq's basis in the ADRs
As explained below, the allocation of fees by Compaq as between basis and
amount realized appears suspect. The pre-fee adjusted loss was $19,165,000
($868,412,129 re-sell price minus $887,577,129 purchase price). It appears that the
adjustments to basis and amount realized were done so as to maximize the basis
amount and thereby increase the capital loss for tax purposes. If the $1,485,685 fees
detailed by the court are added to that loss, the total economic cost is $20,650,685 -
or $1311 less than the amount deposited by Compaq to its Bear Stearns account. The
court opinions do not state whether Compaq received or paid a difference check to
close out the Bear Steams account.
The pre-fee-adjusted economic loss of $19,165,000 is $1070 more than the net
dividend amount of $19,163,930. Twenty-First lowered its original commission from
$1,000,000 to $998,929 - a difference of $1071 - in order "to offset computational
errors in calculating some of the purchase trades." Id. at 218-19 (the precise amount
of the reduction in fees was $1070.55). The intent clearly was to match precisely the
net dividend and the pre-fee adjusted capital loss - that is, Compaq intended to pay
a purchase price for the ADRs precisely equal to the market price plus 85% of the
gross dividend.
131 Id. at 219.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 218. In addition, a $37 margin write-off credit was specified. Id.
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or in the amount realized on the re-sale.
35
2. Pre-Tax, Post-Tax
In court, Compaq argued that it had a pre-tax profit objective and
that, in fact, the transaction had generated a pre-tax profit of
approximately $1.9 million - the difference between the gross
dividend and its economic loss. The discussion by both the Tax Court
and the Fifth Circuit largely focused on whether pre-tax profit should
be measured by comparing the economic loss to the net dividend or
- -. 136
the gross dividend. The Tax Court rejected Compaq's approach
while the Fifth Circuit agreed that the gross dividend was the
appropriate measure. The Fifth Circuit also placed some emphasis on
the trades having occurred pursuant to exchange rules and through an
open market process.'37 The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and
upheld the transaction.
If the courts had decided this case by looking at the return before
both explicit taxes and the implicit tax subsidy, the transaction would
135 Id. at 221. The method of allocating these fees as between basis and amount
realized is unclear given the numbers the court provides. Compaq reported its
adjusted basis in the ADRs as being $888,535,869 - $958,740 larger than the
purchase price of $887,577,129. Compaq reported its amount realized on the sale as
$867,883,053 - $529,076 smaller than the sale price of $868,412,129. These two
adjustments add up to $1,487,816, which is $2131 larger than the total transaction
costs reported. While the numbers are not entirely reconciled, what does seem
sufficiently clear is that, roughly, two-thirds of the costs were capitalized into basis
and, roughly, one-third into amount realized, which would have increased the capital
loss.
136 Id. at 222; Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, 277 F.3d 778, 782 (5th
Cir. 2001); see also MCDANIEL, supra note 6, at 1332 (pointing out that the Fifth
Circuit ignored the fact that "the transactions would not have been undertaken absent
the U.S. and Netherlands tax considerations that both created the potential for
before-tax profit and made realization of an after-tax profit possible").
137 The court explained as follows:
Although... the parties attempted to minimize the risks incident to the
transaction, those risks did exist and were not by any means insignificant.
The transaction occurred on a public market, not in an environment
controlled by Compaq or its agents. The market prices of the ADRs could
have changed during the course of the transaction... ; any of the individual
trades could have been broken up or, for that matter, could have been
executed incorrectly, and the dividend might not have been paid or might
have been paid in an amount different from that anticipated by Compaq.
Compaq, 277 F.3d at 787.
HeinOnline  -- 27 Va. Tax Rev. 821 2007-2008
Virginia Tax Review
have been found to yield an obvious pre-tax loss. 138 Although Compaq
presents a case in which quantifying the implicit subsidy was fairly
straightforward, in other transactions, quantifying implicit taxes may
be more difficult. The proposed framework uses a more indirect
approach to dealing with implicit taxes by focusing on after-tax results
and utilizing comparables 3 9
Under the framework proposed in this article, Compaq's after-tax
return first would be computed. Compaq reported a $20.7 million
capital loss, which at a uniform 34% rate'4° would yield $7 million of
tax savings. Although Compaq would have to pay tax of $7.7 million
to the U.S government and $3.4 million to the Netherlands on the
gross dividend of $22.5 million, it would receive a $3.4 million foreign
tax credit T4 for the taxes paid to the Netherlands. Thus, the total post-
142tax return amount was $1.1 million. Compaq only invested $20.7
million (at most) of its own money. While it may seem appropriate to
143
compute the rate of post-tax return on this amount, in order to
make a rate comparison between Compaq's suspect transaction and
economically equivalent transactions, the investment base should be
the $887.6 million ADR purchase price (even though most of this was
borrowed).' 44 With the larger base, the total after-tax return is
approximately 0.124%, but this is the return over a five-day period. If
Compaq continued to earn the same rate over a year-long period, the
annual return would have been approximately 9%.
138 Knoll, supra note 57, at 839.
139 See supra Part IV.A.
140 The top corporate tax rate in 1992 was 34%. See Citizens Federal Bank v.
United States, 66 Fed. Cl. 179, 203 (2005). Although the corporate tax rate schedule is
progressive, the benefit of the lower rate brackets is eliminated after the corporation
surpasses certain amounts of income. In 1992, income between $100,000 and $335,000
was subject to what was essentially a 39% rate. See also JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES, AND THEIR OWNERS 22 (Foundation Press 2005) (describing phaseout of
tax benefits from lower corporate tax brackets).
141 There was apparently no dispute that this was the correct amount of the tax
credit under the formal rules on tax credits. See Compaq, 277 F.3d 778.
142 $7 million tax saving on capital loss + $22.5 million dividend + $3.4 million tax
credit - $7.7 million U.S. tax on dividend - $3.4 million Netherlands tax on dividend -
$20.7 million capital loss. (This accepts Compaq's capitalization of expenses into
amount realized and tax basis.)
143 Which would be an approximately 5% return in five days (387.9% return
annualized).
'4" See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (explaining inclusion of debt in
the investment base).
[Vol. 27:783
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The only variables in this transaction for Compaq were the
extraordinarily remote possibility that an unrelated third party would
break up the cross-sales and that Gallagher would default on its
obligation to re-purchase. If Gallagher had defaulted, Compaq could
have mitigated any losses by finding another buyer for the publicly
traded ADRs (though by then the dividend-related loss may have
vanished). While Compaq (and possibly the Fifth Circuit) would
disagree, the possibility was so remote as to be safely ignored when
approaching the problem of locating an economically equivalent
market comparable.
A highly plausible framing of the substantive economic
relationship is that Compaq extended a collateralized, short-term loan
to Gallagher - or, in more technical terms, that Compaq entered into
a reverse repurchase agreement (reverse repo). 145 In a reverse repo, a
146buyer/lender purchases securities for cash from a seller/borrower.
The parties agree that at the end of some stated time period -
frequently a matter of days or weeks - the seller/borrower will buy
the securities back from the original buyer/lender at a set price
reflecting an interest component (the repo rate).1 47 Reverse repos
carry some risk of default, which increases with the length of time the
transaction is held open. The value of collateral mitigates this risk and
affects the overall return.
Treasury securities are commonly used as collateral, and data on
repo rates for nontreasury securities is difficult to obtain. One
substitute is the "general collateral rate," which is the term used for
the highest repo rate available at a particular time on treasuries.
4 1
"The overnight general collateral rate is commonly near the federal
funds rate."14 9 For the time period at issue in Compaq, the overnight
federal funds rate was an annualized return of between 3.07% and
145 Aspects of the transaction are anomalous for a reverse repo. The payment
method on the transaction was somewhat unusual. Generally, the interest component
is paid by the buyer/lender selling the securities back at a higher price than that
originally paid. Here, Compaq sold the ADRs back at a lower price and was instead
compensated through receipt of the dividend. Usually dividends accruing on the
subject of a reverse repo are paid over to the original seller (which would be
Gallagher).
146 See Darrell Duffie, Special Repo Rates, 51 J. FIN. 493,497 (1996).
147 See Sheldon v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 738, 742 (1990) (describing repo
transaction).
148 See Duffie, supra note 146, at 498.
149 See id. at 499.
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3.28%.150 Applying a 34% tax rate would give a range of 2.02% to
2.16%. The five-day term would increase the return, but it is doubtful
that any increase would bring it into substantial proximity to
Compaq's annualized 9% after-tax return.'
Under the proposed comparables test, Compaq's transaction
would be presumed to fail the objective inquiry. Compaq would then
be afforded the opportunity to rebut this presumption by showing that
the return was the result of Compaq being a member of a naturally
occurring tax clientele for these ADRs. Professors Klein and Stark
have previously articulated the argument that Compaq may have
engaged in simple, clientele-based arbitrage." 2 They note that the rule
at issue in Compaq was one tied to the arbitrary decision to tax
dividends to the owner on the record date.'53 According to professors
Klein and Stark:
[This] rule permitted U.S. taxpayers to profit, with minimal
risk, from a form of tax arbitrage between two taxpayers with
different tax characteristics.... The Compaq arbitrage
opportunity seems to have arisen because the two parties
valued the dividend differently.... Indeed, any investor
subject to any tax rate should find the Compaq transaction
attractive, as long as it is allowed to deduct the capital loss
that arises from the sale of the stock ex-dividend .
Professors Klein and Stark also discussed factors weighing against
this possibility, including the prearranged nature of the Compaq
transaction, the "purchase" of the transaction through a tax shelter
promoter, and the use of one of the promoter's clients as the
1s0 The Federal Reserve Board, H15 Selected Interest Rates,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Build.aspx?rel=H15 (choose "Series
Type": "Selected Interest Rates"; then choose "Instrument": "Federal Funds"; then
choose "Maturity": "Overnight"; then choose "Frequency": "Weekly"; then choose
"Add to package"; follow "Go to Format"; select "September 1992" as date;
download data) (last visited Feb. 24, 2008).
151 To add another point of comparison, during this same time period, the bank
prime loan rate was 6% annualized. See The Federal Reserve Board, H15 Selected
Interest Rates, http://www.federalreserve.gov/datadownload/Build.aspx?rel=Hl5
(follow steps in footnote 139, except choose "Instrument": "Bank prime loan") (last
visited Feb. 24, 2008).
152 Klein & Stark, supra note 4, at 1335-36.
153 Id. at 1339.
154 Id. at 1339-40.
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counterparty.15 1 In addition, Compaq's payment precisely matched the
ADR market price plus the net dividend. The preciseness of the
match provides some evidence that Compaq could not have simply
gone into the market without the pre-packaging and received the
same deal. These factors weigh heavily against the transaction arising
from a naturally occurring tax clientele opportunity. Of course,
Compaq did not know that the counterparty would be the same on
both the purchase and the re-sale of the ADRs, and it may not have
viewed the transaction as in substance a "reverse repurchase
agreement." Although possibly unaware of the details of the
transaction, Compaq's ignorance points more toward failure of
objective economic substance than otherwise. At a minimum,
Compaq certainly knew it had left the details of the transaction in the
hands of a promoter of tax avoidance shelters.
B. Black & Decker v. United States
1. Transaction
The tax avoidance technique at issue in Black & Decker Corp. v.
• .. 15615
United States is elegant in its simplicity. Black & Decker"' provided
medical and dental benefits to "thousands" of employees and
158
retirees. Black & Decker's monetary obligation for benefit claims
could not be ascertained with absolute certainty since the amount
would depend on the health of the employees and retirees 5 9 The
estimated obligation had a net present value of $560 million.'
6
Presumably, this estimate was reached using standard actuarial tools.
The accuracy of the estimate would also have been enhanced by the
155 Id.
156 Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 2006); see
Ethan Yale, Reexamining Black & Decker's Contingent Liability Tax Shelter, 108 TAX
NOTES 223, 223 (July 11, 2005) (describing the shelter as "surprisingly simple"). I owe
thanks to Marty McMahon for suggesting Black & Decker as an additional case to
analyze under my proposal.
The transaction in Black & Decker is similar to the one at issue in Coltec
Industries v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 716 (2004), rev'd, 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
157 "Black & Decker" is used throughout to denote The Black & Decker
Corporation as well as "its domestic direct and indirect subsidiaries." Black & Decker,
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relatively large pool of people insured. Black & Decker owned all the
common stock of Black & Decker Healthcare Management, Inc.
(BDHMI).6
The tax avoidance transaction required two phases. The first
phase took place on November 25, 1998. On this date, Black &
Decker16 transferred $561 million in cash to BDHMI in exchange for
BDHMI preferred stock and BDHMI's assumption of Black &
Decker's contingent medical liabilities. BDHMI's "assumption of
liability did not constitute either a legal defeasance ... or a novation
and consequently, [Black & Decker] continued to be primarily liable"
on the claims.164 Black & Decker took a $561 million tax basis in the




163 In addition to the parent corporation, a Canadian subsidiary transferred cash
and received preferred stock in the exchange. Id.
164 Id. (quoting record and omitting alterations made to that record).
165 Black & Decker's transaction was governed by section 351, which provides for
a tax-free exchange of property for stock if the property transferor (or group of
property transferors) has control of the transferee corporation immediately following
the exchange. I.R.C. § 351(a). If the transferor receives cash or other property in
addition to the stock, receipt of this "boot" will require the transferor to recognize
some income for tax purposes. I.R.C. § 351(b). Generally, if the transferee
corporation assumes liabilities of the transferor, such assumption is not treated as
boot. I.R.C. § 357(a). Such amount of the debt assumption must generally, however,
reduce the transferor's tax basis in the stock received. I.R.C. §§ 358(a)(1)(A)(ii),
(d)(1). But reduction is not required if the liability assumed would have given rise to a
deduction if the liability had been retained and paid by the transferor. I.R.C. §§
357(c)(3), 358(d)(2); see Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36 (no reduction required in
case of contingent liability assumed that would have given rise to basis if retained by
the transferor); see also Douglas A. Kahn & Dale A. Oesterle, A Definition of
"Liabilities" in Internal Revenue Code Section 357 and 358(d), 73 MICH. L. REv. 461
(1975).
Black & Decker took a $561 million basis by transferring $561 million of cash to
the corporation. Black & Decker asserted that assumption of the debt by BDHMI did
not trigger gain recognition and did not require basis reduction since had Black &
Decker retained the liabilities it would have received a deduction for their payment.
In October 1999, Congress halted the transaction by adding section 358(h).
Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 309(a), 114 Stat.
2763, 2763A-638. Section 358(h) applies to a section 351 transaction if (1) a transferor
receives stock whose value is less than its basis, as calculated under the generally
applicable rules and (2) the transferee corporation assumes liabilities that are not
treated as "money" for purposes of section 358(d) (e.g., contingent liabilities). In such
a case, the transferor is required to reduce its basis (but not below fair market value)
HeinOnline  -- 27 Va. Tax Rev. 826 2007-2008
2008] Risk, Return, and Objective Economic Substance 827
On December 29, 1998, Black & Decker sold the preferred stock
received in the exchange for $1 million. The purchaser was "an
unrelated third-party trust benefiting a former [Black & Decker]
executive."'6 Black & Decker reported a $560 million capital loss
from this transaction, which it used to offset capital gains from
unrelated transactions from the same year, as well as to reduce taxes
from other years.1 67 BDHMI would pay the obligations and then claim
a tax deduction for the payment. To the extent BDHMI could not use
the deduction, it could be carried forward (and back) as a net
operating loss. The effect would be a potential doubling168 of the
deduction for the payment of the claims and the conversion of an
ordinary loss to a capital loss for Black & Decker.' 69
Black & Decker was following a generic pattern used by "most of
the major accounting firms.' 170 This generic pattern is particularly
problematic because it relied on a fairly straightforward application of
statutory and administrative authorities (later amended to halt the
transaction). 7' A couple of additional facts in the Black & Decker
case, however, lessen the difficulty of getting at the transaction. First,
Black & Decker had borrowed the $561 million cash transferred to
BDHMI from "its banks for thirty days."' 72 Second, on the same day
Black & Decker sold its preferred stock, it also borrowed $564 million
from BDHMI. 1 3 The installment payments on this financing were
"designed to provide BDHMI sufficient funds to pay the benefits
liabilities as they came due.'
174
These financing steps are susceptible to a simple substance-over-
form approach. Two obvious questions are whether Black & Decker,
in the stock received by the amount of liabilities assumed. I.R.C. § 358(h)(1). This
rule does not apply if the assets or business associated with the liabilities is also
transferred. I.R.C. § 358(h)(2). In the contingent liability shelter, only the contingent
liabilities were transferred and not the assets or business generating the income
related to the liabilities.
16 Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 433.
167 Id.
168 Section 351 generally operates to provide a doubling of tax gains and losses -
one level occurring at the shareholder level and the other at the corporate level.
169 Apparently, Black & Decker would eventually add BDHMI back to its
consolidated group and use the NOLs itself. Yale, supra note 156.
170 Id.
171 See supra note 165 (describing the statutory argument).
172 Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 433.
173 Id.
174 Id,
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as a matter of substance, transferred property (cash) to BDHMI and
whether BDHMI, as a matter of substance, took over payment on the
liabilities. The government does not seem to have used a more general
substance-over-form attack in the Black & Decker litigation"' -
presumably because it wished to get at the generic shelter type. 176 The
financing details of Black & Decker, however, raise the possibility that
similar cash circles appeared in other iterations of the same
contingency liability technique.
2. After-Tax Inquiry
Economic substance may not be necessary to successfully attack
the contingency liability shelter. This Part explores, for the sake of
illustration, how such an attack might be structured under the
proposed objective economic substance framework. This Part
considers both the Black & Decker transaction and the generic
shelter. In both cases, the proposed objective economic substance
method could be used to disallow the tax benefits sought.
Additionally, although a comparable transaction is suggested in both
cases, the market for that comparable is such that the more open-
ended factor based inquiry is likely necessary.
a. Black & Decker Contingent Liabilities Transaction
Even after the transaction with BDHMI occurred, Black &
Decker in substance continued to self-insure the contingent liabilities.
In other words, Black & Decker did not experience any actual relief
from risk by paying BDHMI (and by implication, BDHMI acted as an
economic nonentity). Black & Decker transferred the present value of
the estimated liability to the subsidiary, but Black & Decker borrowed
that same amount back from the subsidiary and then apparently made
loan payments designed to match the expected payouts on the
contingent liabilities that BDHMI assumed. 117 Further, Black &
175 See Lee A. Sheppard, Drafting Economic Substance, Part 3, 106 TAX NOTES
1020, 1024 (Feb. 28, 2005) ("[T]he taxpayers' assertions that the transfer of liabilities
was effective went unchallenged by the government.").
176 Hints of a more general substance-over-form approach appear in Notice 2001-
17, which identified the contingent liability maneuver as a listed transaction subject to
the tax shelter registration regulations. I.R.S. Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730. The
notice gives as one disallowance approach "that the transfer of the asset to the
transferee corporation is not, in substance, a transfer of property in exchange for
stock within the meaning of § 352 .. ." Id.
177 Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 433.
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Decker retained primary liability on the contingent liabilities. Even if
Black & Decker had some indemnity claim against BDHMI, it would
be of little value since the only items inside BDHMI were the
contingent liabilities and its loan to Black & Decker. If Black &
Decker had retained the liabilities outright, it would not have been
able to deduct the contingent liabilities until payment. Thus, the
only effect of the transaction was to substantially reduce Black &
Decker's after-tax cost of carrying these liabilities, since Black &
Decker did not part with the risks associated with them.
Arguably, this is sufficient to deny Black & Decker the benefits of
the transaction without engaging in the factor-based inquiry.
Retention of responsibility on these types of claims is considered self-
insurance. 79 Self-insurance is a fairly common practice, and
information on the after-tax cost of doing so may be available. It
seems certain that by reducing its costs through its transactions with
BDHMI, Black & Decker received a return (through cost reduction)
substantially higher than that available in standard self-insurance
arrangements. Further, since Black & Decker was dealing only with a
controlled entity, the possibility of rebutting the presumption of
failure through showing a natural tax clientele is remote.
Since, however, the idea of a market in self-insurance is somewhat
contradictory and since public information on those costs may be
difficult to obtain, the more general, factor-based test is examined.'s °
Various factors strongly suggest that nothing occurred except tax
manipulation (indeed, on the subjective inquiry, Black & Decker
essentially conceded this was the case). 8' The proposed self-insurance
comparable points in that direction, and Black & Decker relied on a
package transaction marketed by accounting firms. Black & Decker
created and controlled the subsidiary used in the transaction. The
subsidiary was sold to a party who, though technically unrelated, was
178 See William B. Barker, Federal Income Taxation & Captive Insurance, 6 VA.
TAX REV. 267, 280 (1986) ("[S]ums set aside are not business 'expenses,' since the
taxpayer retains a proprietary interest in the fund and the 'payments' are merely a
reserve for future contingent liabilities. This follows even when the funds are
transferred to and administered by an independent agent or insurance company.").
179 The term "self-insurance" is a misnomer because retention of liability means
that the taxpayer has not acquired insurance. That is, the taxpayer has not shifted risk
away from itself. See id. ("[T]here [is] no risk transfer in a self-insurance plan .....
180 See supra Part IV.B.2 (describing test).
181 Black & Decker, 436 F.3d at 441 (noting that Black & Decker conceded tax
motive for purposes of motion for summary judgment).
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controlled by an individual closely affiliated with Black & Decker.
In short, the proposed re-design of the objective profit inquiry could
be used to disallow the claimed tax benefits of the transaction.
b. Generic Contingent Liabilities Shelter
Service Notice 2001-17 on contingent liabilities suggests that the
transaction is in substance "simply a payment to the transferee for its
assumption of a liability."183 Such a payment also suggests another
plausible comparable transaction. A business with a contingent
liability may legitimately wish to hedge against the risks inherent in
carrying that liability, and paying a fixed sum to a third party in
exchange for relief from the liability would create such a hedge.
84
Though hedging transactions are common, it may be difficult to obtain
information about specific terms - including the after-tax position of
the parties. Even so, the principal arm's length determinants of price
are reasonably ascertainable, and such an examination suggests
disallowance of the contingency liability transaction.
Parties dealing at arm's length would first determine the expected
cost of the contingent liability. The liability-assuming party would,
however, be unlikely to accept a payment exactly equal to the
expected cost. That is, the liability-assuming party would require some
additional inducement (a risk premium), the amount of which would
depend on the distribution of the possible outcomes."' For example, a
contingent liability with a 50% probability of a $101 payment and a
50% probability of a $99 payment yields an expected cost of $100. The
expected cost would also be $100 if there were a 20% probability of a
$400 payment and an 80% probability of a $25 payment. But the
liability-assuming party would almost certainly require a larger
inducement in the latter case than in the former.
The cash transferred to the subsidiary in the generic contingent
liability transaction was likely quite close to the estimated present
value of the contingent liabilities. Such a small additional payment
may indicate a price that is far lower than that which would be
182 See Lederman, supra note 5 ("A close relationship that does not fall within
the related-party rules can provide opportunities to coordinate on tax reduction.").
183 Notice 2001-17, 2001-1 C.B. 730. In 2002, the government created a settlement
initiative for purposes of dealing with the many taxpayers who entered into variations
of this transaction. Rev. Proc. 2002-67, 2002-2 C.B. 733.
184 Such a payment would not be immediately deductible but would have to be
capitalized.
185 See BODIE ET AL., supra note 63, at 142-44 (describing risk premiums).
[Vol. 27:783
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charged by a third party operating at arm's length. In the Black &
Decker transaction, for example, only $1 million was paid over and
above the estimated $560 million present value cost of the liabilities.
$1 million is only 0.18% of $560 million. The court opinions do not
provide information as to the possible outcomes accounted for in the
$560 million estimated present value of the liabilities, and generally,
such information may be difficult to obtain. Thus, it is not known
whether this amount was reasonable given the contingency risks. Still,
one wonders whether an unrelated third party would take on these
liabilities for such a small inducement. (Of course, as argued above,
BDHMI did not actually take over the liabilities.) The tax position of
Black & Decker seems to underscore, rather than lessen, the
insufficiency of this payment. Black & Decker's position that it could
soon deduct the payment would likely have given a third party the
ability to extract a higher payment in the form of implicit taxes
(although this would also depend on the third party's tax treatment
and rate bracket).
Further analysis under the factor-based inquiry would depend
largely on how a particular iteration was carried out. It seems likely,
however, that shelter indicia similar to those present in Black &
Decker would also be present in other companies' attempts to use the
transaction.
VI. CONCLUSION
Tax agencies have been regularly criticized for being
indiscriminate in their use of the economic substance doctrine.186
While some of this overuse may be the result of overreaching, it is also
genuinely difficult to know in advance whether the doctrine will work
against a particular transaction. The proposed framework would add
an initial, brighter-line approach to the question of whether a given
transaction has objective economic substance. The after-tax viewpoint
automatically accounts for any implicit taxes. Providing the taxpayer
the opportunity to rebut a presumption of failure helps avoid
tarnishing a naturally occurring tax clientele with the tax shelter
brush. Even if a suitable, economically equivalent market comparable
is not available, the initial focus on locating such a comparable should
better anchor the inquiry into objective economic substance. The
186 See Joseph Bankman, The Tax Shelter Battle, in THE CRISIS IN TAX
ADMINISTRATION 9, 18-19 (Henry J. Aaron & Joel Slemrod, eds. 2004) ("[I]t might
be wiser to rely more on arguments that are more narrowly focused.").
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proposed framework still, however, requires considerable discretion
and extensive fact-finding, and thus leaves plenty of space for "wrong"
decisions - but also for government adaptation to tax avoidance
innovations.
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